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1 
MODULARITY THEORY AND 
INTERNET REGULATION 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
Recent debates over Internet policy have focused on the net-
work’s architecture. For example, the central justification for the Fed-
eral Communications Commission’s Open Internet proceeding is that 
the Internet’s architecture was critical to its past success and must be 
preserved. Unfortunately, policymakers and commentators have 
failed to provide any theoretical basis for determining whether any 
network configuration is optimal or when changed circumstances 
might justify a change to the architecture. The result is a regulatory 
approach that is unnecessarily static and reflexively accepting of the 
status quo, while failing to provide a basis for distinguishing between 
architectural changes that are part of the network’s natural evolution 
and those that are potentially anticompetitive. 
This Article fills the void by providing an analytical framework 
for assessing network architecture based on modularity theory. It syn-
thesizes modularity theory into five key concepts: near decomposi-
tion, interdependencies, abstraction/information hiding, requisite va-
riety, and testing/integration. It then surfaces the tradeoffs inherent in 
the architectural decision by identifying the benefits and costs associ-
ated with modular architectures and analyzing the dynamics of archi-
tectural change. It concludes by using the framework to evaluate a se-
ries of recent policy applications, including the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, network neutrality, the transition from IPv4 to IPv6, 
calls for opening the Apple iPhone’s application programming inter-
faces (“API”s), and the evolution of future Internet architectures. 
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An architectural approach based on modularity theory yields a 
number of important insights. It surfaces the inevitability of the 
tradeoff between generality and cost minimization and how generality 
can obstruct certain types of innovation. It underscores how parallel 
experimentation can accelerate innovation at the same time that the 
lack of coordination can stunt it. Moreover, like any design hierarchy, 
modular systems can resist technological change. Finally, it under-
scores the contingent nature of network architecture and provides 
heuristics for identifying when architectural change can be beneficial. 
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“[T]his Committee must keep in view a fundamental fact about the 
Internet: . . . the innovation and explosive growth of the Internet is di-
rectly linked to its particular architectural design. . . . If this Committee 
wants to preserve that growth and innovation, it should take steps to pro-
tect this fundamental design.” 
- Statement of Lawrence Lessig Before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science & Transportation1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent debates over Internet policy have proceeded from the prem-
ise that the Internet’s success has stemmed in large part from its architec-
ture and that this architecture must be preserved if that success is to con-
tinue. The current debate over network neutrality provides an apt 
illustration of these dynamics. The Open Internet Order that the D.C. 
Circuit struck down in January 2014 lauded how the network “architec-
ture enables innovators to create and offer new applications and services 
without needing approval from any controlling entity, be it a network 
provider, equipment manufacturer, industry body, or government agen-
cy,” which in turn permits “new technologies to be developed and dis-
tributed by a broad range of sources, not just by the companies that op-
erate the network.”2 Although the details of the revised Open Internet 
Order currently pending before the Federal Communications Commis-
sion has not yet been released, most expect that the new order will follow 
the same line of reasoning. 
Commentators generally agree that modularity, the partitioning of a 
system into subsystems that are structurally independent but work to-
gether, represents one of the key architectural principles around which 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 54 
(2006) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Hearing], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
109shrg30115/pdf/CHRG-109shrg30115.pdf (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig). 
 2. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, 25 FCC 
Rcd. 17905, 17910 ¶ 13 (2010) [hereinafter Open Internet Order]. 
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the Internet was designed and to which it owes much of its success.3 
Computer scientists almost universally discuss modularity almost exclu-
sively in laudatory terms and rightfully so.4 The shift to modularity 
played a critical role in triggering the explosion in computer technology 
since the mid-1960s.5 Indeed, as will be subsequently discussed at greater 
length, it represents the primary mechanism for making complex systems 
tractable.6 Furthermore, the current modular architecture has proven in-
credibly resilient and robust over a period spanning several decades.7 
That said, recognizing that modularity provides substantial benefits 
still leaves a host of questions unanswered. For example, is modularity 
always the best choice? If not, under what circumstances is modularity 
optimal and suboptimal?8 The absence of such a theory overlooks the 
fact that “neither modular designs nor interdependent designs are inher-
ently superior.”9 On the contrary, engineering principles recognize that 
no one architecture does everything well and thus, that every architec-
ture necessarily involves tradeoffs. Assessments about the relative merits 
of particular modular schemes require evaluating the forces resting on 
each side of this balance in any particular context. 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. See, e.g., Net Neutrality Hearing, supra note 1, at 10, 12–13 (statement of Vinton G. Cerf); 
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS 
AND FREEDOM 100–03 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 92 (2001); BARBARA VAN 
SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 38–40 (2010); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 31 (2008); Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Mod-
ularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regula-
tion in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 90 (2003). Other major architectural principles in-
clude protocol layering and the end-to-end argument. For discussions of those concepts, see 
Christopher S. Yoo, Protocol Layering and Internet Policy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1707 (2013); and Chris-
topher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Broadband Competition?: A Com-
ment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 23 (2004). This Article ad-
dresses only constructed modular architectures in the digital realm. In so doing, it ignores the 
important literature studying on how modular systems spontaneously evolve in biological systems, 
which is important, but less relevant to modern information technology. See, e.g., Scott F. Gilbert et 
al., Resynthesizing Evolutionary and Developmental Biology, 173 DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 357 
(1996); George von Dassow & Ed Munro, Modularity in Animal Development and Evolution: Ele-
ments of a Conceptual Framework for EvoDevo, 285 J. EXPERIMENTAL ZOOLOGY 307 (1999). 
 4. See, e.g., David Clark, Forward to the First Edition, in LARRY L. PETERSON & BRUCE S. 
DAVIE, COMPUTER NETWORKS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH ix, ix (4th ed. 2007) (observing that “[a]ll 
good computer scientists worship the god of modularity”); M.A. Padlipski, A Perspective on the 
ARPANET Reference Model 1, 7 (Request for Comments 871, Sept. 1982) [hereinafter RFC 871], 
available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc871 (calling modularity a “buzzword” and noting that 
“‘[e]verybody knew’ modularity was a Good Thing”). 
 5. CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES, VOL 1: THE POWER OF 
MODULARITY 221 (2000). 
 6. Id.  
 7. The protocols that form the essence of the Internet date from 1974. See Vinton G. Cerf & 
Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
COMM. 637 (1974). They became the exclusive core routing protocol on January 1, 1983. Jon Postel, 
NCP/TCP Transition Plan (Network Working Group Request for Comments 801, Nov. 1981), availa-
ble at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc801. 
 8. See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 84, 86 (“If modularity brings so many advantages, why aren’t all products 
[and processes] fully modular?”). 
 9. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 258; accord id. at 257 (noting that “there is no economic 
‘right answer’ that works in all cases” when choosing “between an interconnected and a modular ap-
proach”). 
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Moreover, even when modularity is desirable, there are many pos-
sible ways to modularize a system. Any designer of a modular system 
must decide how many modules to create, which design elements should 
be assigned to each module, where the interfaces between modules 
should be located, and how the interfaces between the modules should 
be configured.10 Identification of those determinants allows policymakers 
to create a dynamic theory of architectural design by asking an equally 
important question: how does one recognize the conditions under which 
a modular architecture should change? 
Unfortunately, the considerations underlying these decisions remain 
poorly understood. As one commentator has noted, “the design tradeoffs 
inherent in abstracting from physical resources are rarely acknowledged 
in the computing literature.”11 Other commentators similarly observed 
that “there is little systematic research on how decision makers partition 
designs into modules and what . . . the risks [are] of partitioning incor-
rectly.”12 As a result, the literature tends to treat modular architectures as 
immutable artifacts without providing any heuristics to help determine 
when change might be beneficial. 
This Article seeks to fill the void by exploring the theory underlying 
modularity and applying it to recent and current issues in Internet policy. 
Part II lays out the basic concepts that serve as the foundation for modu-
larity theory. These include near decomposition, the role of interdepend-
encies, abstractions/interfaces, hidden information, requisite variety, and 
testing/integration. Together these concepts underscore that the optimal 
structure of any complex system is determined by technological interde-
pendencies and social considerations. 
Part III describes modularity’s benefits, including the way it makes 
complexity more manageable, increases the speed of innovation, facili-
tates outsourcing, and promotes flexibility. Part IV surfaces the tradeoff 
inherent in modularity by analyzing its costs, including the sunk costs of 
designing a modular architecture, reduction in cost minimization, re-
strictions on innovation, limitations on alternate institutional forms, lack 
of coordination, and excessive rigidity. 
Part V examines the dynamics underlying changes in modular net-
works. This framework makes clear that modular architectures are not 
natural constructs. Instead, they depend on factors such as the nature of 
the interdependencies, technological heterogeneity, speed of technologi-
cal change, and demand heterogeneity. As such, they should be expected 
to change over time. 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. Sendil K. Ethiraj & Daniel Levinthal, Modularity and Innovation in Complex Systems, 50 
MGMT. SCI. 159, 162 (2004); see also Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 
49 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 19, 24 (2002) (“The real issue is normally not whether to be modular 
but how to be modular. Which modularization, which structure of encapsulation boundaries, will yield 
the best system decomposition?”). 
 11. Jean-François Blanchette, A Material History of Bits, 62 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 
1042, 1047 (2011). 
 12. Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 160. 
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Part VI applies the framework to four major issues in telecommuni-
cations policy: access to unbundled network elements under the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, network neutrality, the shift from Internet 
Protocol version 4 (“IPv4”) to version 6 (“IPv6”), calls for platforms such 
as the Apple iPhone and social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook 
to provide open access to their application programming interfaces 
(“APIs”), and proposals for future Internet architectures. These exam-
ples show how the theory underlying modularity can provide some in-
sights into how best to craft Internet policy. 
II. MODULARITY THEORY BASICS 
Any assessment of whether a particular modular regime is socially 
desirable necessarily depends on having some theoretical framework for 
understanding why modularity exists and what benefits it provides. This 
Part lays out the basic concepts that provide the foundation for that the-
ory, including near decomposition, the role of interdependencies, ab-
stractions and hidden information in interfaces, requisite variety, and 
testing and integration. 
A. Near Decomposition as a Solution to Complexity 
The special challenges associated with developing complex systems 
are well illustrated by an anecdote related by Frederick Brooks in his 
celebrated book, The Mythical Man Month, which documents IBM’s ef-
forts to design System/360, the first fully modular family of computer sys-
tems.13 Consistent with the prevailing conventional wisdom that everyone 
working on a project should have access to all of the available infor-
mation about the project, the managers of the System/360 team insisted 
that every programmer maintain a formal workbook documenting all of 
the other parts of the system. After only six months, the workbook was 
more than five feet thick and required one hundred and fifty pages of 
updates every day.14 This led to Brooks’ famous observation that adding 
more people sometimes slows down projects instead of speeding them 
up. This results from the communication cost associated with keeping 
more people informed possibly exceeding the potential advantages of 
more man-hours and a greater division of labor.15 
The classic solution to this problem is implicit in Herbert Simon’s 
landmark analysis of complex systems.16 Simon suggested that one of the 
best ways to reduce complexity is to decompose the overall system into a 
series of subsystems in which interactions within subsystems are relative-
ly frequent and stronger, while interactions between subsystems are rela-
                                                                                                                                         
 13. FREDERICK P. BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING (1975); Langlois, supra note 10, at 22 (discussing Brooks’ book). 
 14. BROOKS, supra note 13, at 76–77. 
 15. Id. at 18–19. 
 16. Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467 (1962). 
YOO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2016 1:26 PM 
No. 1] MODULARITY THEORY AND INTERNET REGULATION 7 
tively rare and weaker.17 This allows subsystems to operate largely inde-
pendently of one another in the short run, but to integrate into a larger 
complex system over the long run.18 Such a system would only be nearly 
decomposable rather than completely decomposable, as the fact that all 
of the subsystems were part of a larger system meant that some inter-
connections between subsystems would necessarily remain. That said,  
interactions among subsystems would remain relatively weak, but 
nonnegligible.19 
Near decomposition of complex systems yields a number of ad-
vantages. As an initial matter, it makes complex systems easier to de-
scribe and comprehend.20 By creating a larger number of intermediate 
forms that can constitute building blocks for the larger system, near de-
composition permits experimentation to occur on a smaller scale instead 
of with the system as a whole.21 The existence of stable intermediate 
forms also allows complex systems to evolve more rapidly.22 
A related insight emerges from the field of software engineering, 
which has modeled complex tasks into a series of abstract sequential pro-
cesses.23 Subdividing a larger process into a series of smaller subprocesses 
greatly facilitated software engineers’ ability to verify the accuracy of the 
system by allowing them to test portions of the overall system in isola-
tion.24 Similarly, design scholars have turned to near decomposition to 
deal with complexity of designs by organizing tasks into groups that are 
“interlinked, yet sufficiently free of one another to adjust independently 
in a feasible amount of time.”25 
B. Interdependencies as a Determinant of Module Boundaries 
To say that complex systems are more easily analyzed and devel-
oped if broken down into smaller subcomponents does not provide much 
information about how such a decomposition should be implemented. 
Consistent with Simon’s observation that interactions should be frequent 
and strong within subsystems and rare and weak across subsystems,26 
Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark argue that the key to understanding the 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. Id. at 474, 477. 
 18. Id. at 474. 
 19. Id. Simon noted that to be partially decomposable, a complex system must be hierarchical. 
Systems that consist of a repeating structure, such as a linear polymer or a crystal such as a diamond, 
are too flat to permit partial decomposition. Id. at 469. To the extent that such systems are regarded as 
hierarchical, they represent the trivial case of a hierarchy with a span of one. Id. at 471. 
 20. Id. at 477. 
 21. See id. at 470–71. 
 22. Id. at 473. 
 23. For a classic early description, see Edsger W. Dijkstra, The Structure of the “THE”-
Multiprogramming System, 11 COMM. ACM 341, 343 (1968). 
 24. Id. at 344. 
 25. CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, NOTES ON THE SYNTHESIS OF FORM 43 (1967); see also id. at 
81–83, 116–19. 
 26. See Simon, supra note 16, at 477 and accompanying text (observing that in near decomposa-
ble systems, “[i]ntracomponent linkages are generally stronger than intercomponent linkages”). 
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“points of natural division” between the elements of a modular architec-
ture is task interdependencies.27 System architects must group tasks that 
have strong interdependencies with each other inside the same proto-
module, and then must “systematically . . . sever all dependencies known 
to exist across the protomodules.”28 This implies that a well-designed 
module is “a unit whose structural elements are powerfully connected 
among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements in other 
units.”29 The boundaries between modules are located at the “thin cross-
ing points” where interdependencies are the thinnest.30 Design theorist 
Christopher Alexander similarly advocated including variables whose in-
teractions are very rich within the same subset, thereby permitting the 
subsets to act relatively independently.31 Organizational theorist James 
Thompson advocated grouping reciprocally interdependent tasks togeth-
er and relying on key positions to serve as bridges to other groups.32 
Encapsulating highly interdependent tasks within the same module 
also reduces the costs of communication and coordination by reducing 
the need for cross-boundary communication,33 with cheaper cross-group 
communication leading to a larger number of modules.34 
The initial modular design must be based on the architect’s exper-
tise.35 Establishing these basic design rules has the effect of privileging 
certain parameters and “declaring certain parts of the design space to be 
out of bounds.”36 No matter how well system architects believe they un-
                                                                                                                                         
 27. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 64. 
 28. Id. at 70. 
 29. Id. at 63; accord MEILIR PAGE-JONES, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STRUCTURED SYSTEMS 
DESIGN 101–03 (1980) (arguing that the measure of good modular design is the extent to which it min-
imizes interdependence between modules to make them as independent as possible); Sendil K. Ethiraj 
et al., The Dual Role of Modularity: Innovation and Imitation, 54 MGMT. SCI. 939, 939 (2008) (“It is 
generally accepted that a modular design is based on a principle of encapsulating interdependencies 
within self-contained units called modules and minimizing reciprocal interdependencies between 
modules.”); Eric von Hippel, Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable, 19 RES. POL’Y 407, 
409, 411–12 (1990) (arguing that innovation projects should be partitioned to minimize problem-
solving interdependencies, which occur when changes in the information relating to one task require 
problem-solving in tasks on the other side of the partition); see also Melissa A. Schilling, Toward a 
General Modular Systems Theory and Its Application to Interfirm Product Modularity, 25 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 312, 316 (2000) (noting that the scope of modularity is determined by a system’s “syner-
gistic specificity,” which arises when “components of the system . . . require such extensive interaction 
. . . that any change in a component requires extensive compensating changes in other components of 
the system, or else functionality is lost.”). 
 30. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Modularity in the Design of Complex Engineering Sys-
tems, in COMPLEX ENGINEERED SYSTEMS: SCIENCE MEETS TECHNOLOGY 175, 199 (Dan Braha et al. 
eds., 2006); accord von Hippel, supra note 29, at 409. A related, but distinct, approach focuses not on 
current interdependencies, but rather on future technological opportunities, by identifying “difficult 
design decisions or design decisions which are likely to change” and making sure that those decisions 
are locked within a single module. D.L. Parnas, On the Criteria To Be Used in Decomposing Modules, 
15 COMM. ACM 1053, 1058 (1972).  
 31. ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 43, 64–65, 121–24. 
 32. JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 58–60 (1967). 
 33. von Hippel, supra note 29, at 409–10. 
 34. See Scott Schaefer, Product Design Partitions with Complementary Components, 38 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 311, 320 (1999). 
 35. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 68. 
 36. Id. at 68–69. 
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derstand the systems they are designing, they cannot fully understand the 
way the various components interact with one another until they gain 
experience with the system by experimenting with different solutions.37 If 
done badly, the proposed modularization can cause the system to per-
form suboptimally38 or may require a redesign of the architecture.39 In the 
worst case scenario, the interdependencies cannot be solved without re-
designing the basic architecture, in which case the modularization will 
fail.40 
This means that modular systems are never designed in a vacuum. 
Redesigns of current modular systems are framed by the existing modu-
larization. Even with respect to new modularizations, they must respond 
and adjust to the initial design proposed by the architect, which, because 
of the lack of perfect prescience, typically includes some interdependen-
cies that the architect did not foresee.41 The recursive and restricted na-
ture of this adjustment process means that modularization emerges more 
through a process of “improvisation, bricolage, and drift” than from 
“planification and control.”42 
C. Interface Design and the Role of Abstraction and Hidden 
Information 
Dividing a production process into blocks of interdependent pro-
cesses is only one step in modularizing a system. In addition, the archi-
tects must structure the interactions between the modules.43 To do this, 
each module must be reduced to an abstraction,44 which is a simplification 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. See id. at 254 (“Given such a high degree of complexity, it simply is not possible for designers 
to know enough about the system to eliminate all uncertainty. Thus each new design is fundamentally 
an experiment. Its outcome may be guessed, but it cannot be known ahead of time.”); Ethiraj & Levin-
thal, supra note 10, at 172 (“Designers engage in acts of creation, but unlike a divine creator, they lack 
omniscience. Choices of modules are guesses about appropriate decompositions—decompositions that 
even in reality are only partial (i.e., nearly decomposable).”). 
 38. See Langlois, supra note 10, at 26 (noting that “freezing the design rules too early may result 
in an inferior modularization”). 
 39. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 70 (“Imposing a design rule when one is ignorant of the 
true underlying interdependencies can lead to design failure. . . . The best course of action, if possible, 
is to rescind the original design rule, which was based on insufficient knowledge of the critical interde-
pendencies.”). 
 40. Id. at 86 (“In a newly modularized design, when the modules are first brought together, prob-
lematic interactions usually appear and workarounds to those problems must be devised. In the worst 
cases, the workaround will feed back into the module designs, and the modularization itself will fail.”). 
 41. See Schaefer, supra note 34, at 325–26 (showing that the problem devising a truly optimal 
modular design partition is NP complete in that its complexity increases exponentially with the size of 
the problem and concluding “it would seem unlikely that a firm could ever hope to uncover an optimal 
modular design partition for a complex product”). 
 42. Blanchette, supra note 11, at 1055; accord Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 160,  
162, 172. 
 43. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 77. 
 44. For a seminal statement about the benefits of abstractions, see Dijkstra, supra note 23, at 
343. See also HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 17–20, 100–01 (1969). For an 
earlier statement advocating that programs be built around generalized software modules, see W.C. 
McGee, Generalization: Key to Successful Electronic Data Processing, 6 J. ACM 1 (1959). 
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of reality “that suppresses details of elements that do not affect how 
[modules] use, are used by, relate to, or interact with other elements.”45 
Once a system architect predetermines how the modules will inter-
act with one another, the architect must ensure that the programmers 
working on each module refrain from introducing new interdependencies 
that fall outside of the design. Individual programmers who have access 
to all of the information about the entire system will be tempted to use 
that information to improve the performance of the module on which 
they are working. The problem, according to David Parnas’ seminal 
work, is that doing so can “disastrously increase the connectivity of the 
system” by introducing connections between modules that violate the 
goal of keeping the intermodule interdependencies to a minimum.46 
Parnas identified an ingenious way to ensure that the architect re-
tains control over the overall structure. Instead of making all of the de-
sign information available to everyone, Parnas argued that architects 
could maintain the architecture’s integrity by maintaining strict control 
over the distribution of information across the system.47 Specifically, ar-
chitects could carefully design the interfaces connecting modules so that 
they include only the information associated with the interdependencies 
that other modules were permitted to take into account and to withhold 
information about the module’s inner working from the other modules.48 
Information included in the interface is part of the visible information 
shared between modules; design parameters not included in the interface 
are part of the hidden information.49 
Hiding information about the highly interdependent tasks that are 
supposed to be encapsulated within modules makes those tasks opaque 
to other modules and thus prevents them from creating interconnections 
with those tasks that fall outside the architectural design.50 This permits 
other modules to treat every other module as a “black box,”51 which 
greatly reduces communication costs.52 After the computer science com-
munity criticized Parnas’ proposal as “radical” and unworkable,53 Parnas 
took it upon himself to validate the concept by undertaking a real-world 
implementation of it.54 
                                                                                                                                         
 45. LEN BASS ET AL., SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE IN PRACTICE 21 (2d ed. 2003). 
 46. David L. Parnas, Information Distribution Aspects of Design Methodology, 1 INFO. 
PROCESSING 71: PROC. IFIP CONG. 71, at 339, 342 (1972). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 344; accord Parnas, supra note 30, at 1056 (“The second decomposition was made using 
‘information hiding’ as a criterion. . . . Every module in the second decomposition is characterized by 
its knowledge of a design decision which it hides from all others. Its interface or definition was chosen 
to reveal as little as possible about its inner workings.” (citation omitted)). 
 49. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 73–75. 
 50. Langlois, supra note 10, at 22. 
 51. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 91. 
 52. Langlois, supra note 10, at 22–23. 
 53. BROOKS, supra note 13, at 78. 
 54. D.L. Parnas et al., The Modular Structure of Complex Systems, PROC. 7TH INT’L CONF. ON 
SOFTWARE ENG’G 408 (1984). 
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Interfaces thus establish the fundamental assumptions that the vari-
ous modules in a system make about one another and predetermine the 
manner in which the modules will interact.55 As such, decisions about 
what information to include in module interfaces thus represent critical 
architectural choices that must be made deliberately. As one noted mod-
ularity theorist pointed out, “Managers should understand that compo-
nent interfaces are not minor technical details to be left to the engineer-
ing staff. Rather, interfaces will determine the range of strategic 
flexibilities the company will have to configure its products and adapt its 
processes in the future.”56 In other words, interface design determines the 
functionality of the system. Moreover, the points of interactions cannot 
be dealt with in an ad hoc manner. Instead, they must be maintained 
throughout the architecture in a consistent and systematic way.57 
Limiting the number of interdependencies that pass between mod-
ules and the number of states associated with those interdependencies of 
which other modules have to take account simplifies the complexity of 
the system. For example, interdependencies sometimes form a circuit 
that loops back onto itself, such as occurs when task A depends on the 
design of task B, which depends on the design of task C, which recursive-
ly depends on the design of task A. When this occurs, the only way to de-
termine the effect of the interdependencies is to cycle through a series of 
iterations until the design converges on a solution.58 If the design archi-
tecture does not limit the number of interdependencies, system designers 
must test every possible combination of interdependencies, which can 
lead to a “combinatorial explosion of system variants” if left uncabined.59 
Modularity reduces the number of cycles required by narrowing and pre-
determining the universe of potentially relevant interdependencies and 
states.60 
D. Requisite Variety as a Demand-Side Consideration 
While insightful, the interdependency-driven approach to modulari-
ty is subject to an important limitation. In focusing on the technological 
characteristics of production processes, the modularity literature focuses 
exclusively on the supply side. This approach ignores the impact of 
changes on the demand side, such as changes in geographic dispersion 
and the desire for variety. The addition of demand-side considerations 
provides another potential impetus for architectural change. 
                                                                                                                                         
 55. Parnas, supra note 30, at 339. 
 56. Ron Sanchez, Fitting Together a Modular Approach, 81 MFG. ENG’R 216, 217 (2002); see also 
Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 172 (noting that in addition to innovation, “modularity has other 
important implications for strategy, organizational coordination, incentives, and so on”). 
 57. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 73. 
 58. Id. at 51–52, 68–70; see also Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 160 (describing the trial-
and-error process in which changes in one module of the Itanium chip would cause ripple effects that 
disrupted the work on other modules). 
 59. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 272–75. 
 60. Dijkstra, supra note 23, at 344. 
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In this regard, the literature on general purpose technologies 
(“GPT”s) is instructive. GPTs are defined as technologies that are  
(1) widely used, (2) capable of ongoing technical improvement, and  
(3) enabling innovation in applications sectors.61 In one sense, the persis-
tence of GPTs represents something of a puzzle. Adam Smith’s famous 
admonition that “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the 
market” suggests that as the demand for a product increases, its inputs 
should be produced by increasingly specialized vertically disintegrated 
firms.62 
Timothy Bresnahan and Alfonso Gambardella provide an answer to 
this puzzle.63 When the growth of the market consists not of an increase 
in the output of a single good, but rather the proliferation of distinct ap-
plication sectors supported by the GPT, the effect of market growth is to 
entrench the GPT rather than to prompt its vertical disintegration.64 At 
the same time, Bresnahan and Gambardella recognize that “the broad 
applicability of a general specialty is not free” and that as the technologi-
cal needs become increasingly differentiated, the superior matching ben-
efits from localizing technology eventually dominate the benefits from 
generalization.65 
In other words, increases in heterogeneity in demand increases the 
benefits of relying on custom inputs tailored to a particular application’s 
specific needs, which in turn makes GPTs relatively less attractive. At 
some point, demand becomes so heterogeneous that abandonment of the 
GPT becomes optimal. 
Increases in the volatility of the external environment can also cre-
ate pressures for the architecture to change, as demonstrated by W. Ross 
Ashby’s landmark Law of Requisite Variety, which studied ways that cy-
bernetic systems comprised of multiple independent components can re-
store equilibrium when confronted with disturbances.66 Ashby’s model 
takes the form of a two-step game. In the first step, an external disturb-
ance occurs. In the second step, a regulator chooses from the set of re-
sponses that it has designed to respond to each disturbance. Ashby illus-
trated his model with the matrix depicted in Figure 1.67 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 61. Timothy Bresnahan, General Purpose Technologies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION 761, 764 (Bronwyn Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010). 
 62. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
21 (1776); see also George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. 
POL. ECON. 185 (1951). 
 63. See generally Timothy Bresnahan & Alfonso Gambardella, The Division of Inventive Labor 
and the Extent of the Market, in GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 253 
(Elhanan Helpman ed., 1998). 
 64. Id. at 255, 261–62, 272–73. 
 65. Id. at 255, 269–70, 273. 
 66. W. ROSS ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS 206–13 (1956). 
 67. Id. at 202. 
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FIGURE 1 
 Response







 1 b a c 
2 a c b 
3 c b a 
 
Ashby added the further constraint that no column contain a re-
peated outcome. If so, the regulator need not change its move in re-
sponse to different disturbances, which made the game “too easy to be of 
interest.”68 In other words, any rows with duplicate outcomes can simply 
be collapsed into a single row and treated as the same disturbance. 
Suppose that the regulator’s goal is to force good outcome a and 
avoid bad outcomes b and c. The number of responses at its disposal 
gives it the ability to do so. If disturbance 1 occurs, the regulator chooses 
response β. If disturbance 2 occurs, the regulator chooses response α. If 
disturbance 3 occurs, the regulator chooses response γ. Indeed, this table 
gives the regulator complete control over all outcomes, as it can also 
force outcomes b or c to occur regardless of the nature of the disturb-
ance. 
Ashby next explored the relationship between the number of dis-
turbances, the number of responses at the regulator’s disposal, and the 
number of possible outcomes. If there are only three types of disturb-
ances and the regulator has three responses at its disposal, the regulator 
can design its responses to ensure that the game always results in a single 
good outcome, depicted in Figure 2 by the letter k. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 68. Id. at 204. 
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FIGURE 2 
 Response








1 k - - 
2 - k -
3 - - k 
4 l - - 
5 - l -
6 - - l 
7 m - - 
8 - m -
9 - - m 
 
Suppose, however, that a fourth type of disturbance emerges. The 
assumption that any particular outcome cannot appear more than once in 
any particular column dictates that the existence of this fourth type of 
disturbance necessarily means that the regulator can no longer restrict 
the game to a single outcome. Instead, it must tolerate at least two possi-
ble outcomes, k and l, and can do so for up to six disturbances. The 
emergence of a seventh type of disturbance would require the regulator 
to permit a third outcome, m.69 
Stated more generally, if the regulator has n possible responses, it 
can ensure a single outcome so long as the number of disturbances is less 
than or equal to n, after which point the number of possible outcomes 
must increase to two. The number of disturbances can increase up to 2n 
before the number of possible outcomes increases again to three. The 
number of outcomes will increase for every additional n disturbances. In 
short, the total variety of outcomes cannot be fewer than the number of 
disturbances divided by the number of responses.70 This implies that as 
the number of potential disturbances increases, the regulator either must 
be able to tolerate a wider range of outcomes or must increase the num-
ber of possible responses. 
                                                                                                                                         
 69. See id. at 205–06. 
 70. Id. at 206. 
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This insight leads directly to the Law of Requisite Variety. Simply 
stated, increasing the variety of responses is the only way to force down 
the variety of outcomes arising from the variety in disturbances.71 In oth-
er words, only variety (in responses) can destroy variety (in disturb-
ances).72 Or in the words of another theorist, “to be efficaciously adap-
tive, the internal complexity of a system must match the external 
complexity it confronts.”73 
The Law of Requisite Variety has direct implications for the design 
of a modular architecture. Two noted modularity theorists have created a 
model in which certain changes in the environment give rise to a certain 
type of modularization. Most importantly for our purposes, fragmenta-
tion of the external environment (through increased “geographic disper-
sion, specialized market niches, and varied demands on the system”) re-
quires that the system adopt new responses to register the additional 
sources of variety.74 
Furthermore, because the number of distinct disturbances in the en-
vironment determines the number of responses that must be built into 
the architecture, a regulator must ascertain which disturbances are in fact 
distinct. While it is tempting to treat every single disturbance as unique, 
increasing the number of responses is expensive.75 On the other hand, 
grouping multiple disturbances together risks oversimplification, which 
in turn would leave the system unable to respond to important contin-
gencies.76 The designer of a modular system must determine which dis-
turbances must be taken into account and which can be safely ignored. 
Such an exercise cannot be conducted in the abstract and must reflect the 
motivations and expectations around which the system was built77 as well 
as the context surrounding it.78 
The demand-side literature thus augments the focus on interde-
pendency by adding a second potential source of architectural change. 
Unlike interdependencies, which, because they reflect the nature of the 
production function, are necessarily supply-side considerations, factors 
such as geographic dispersion, market differentiation, and the desire for 
variety are quintessential demand-side considerations. In this manner, 
the addition of demand-side factors is consistent with the core economic 
insight of neoclassical economics that rejected value as determined solely 
                                                                                                                                         
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 207. 
 73. Max Boisot & Bill McKelvey, Complexity and Organization-Environment Relations: Revisit-
ing Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLEXITY AND MANAGEMENT 
279, 279 (Peter Allen et al. eds., 2011). 
 74. J. Douglas Orton & Karl E. Weick, Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization, 15 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 203, 207–208, 217 fig.1 (1990). 
 75. Boisot & McKelvey, supra note 73, at 283. 
 76. Id. at 279. 
 77. Id. at 283. 
 78. Jeff Goldstein, Requisite Variety and the Difference That Makes a Difference: An Introduction 
to W. Ross Ashby’s “Variety, Constraint and Law of Requisite Variety”, 13 EMERGENCE: COMPLEXITY 
& ORG. 190, 192–97 (2011). 
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by supply-side factors and replaced it with a vision in which value is de-
termined by the interaction of both supply and demand.79 
The addition of demand-side considerations suggests that the de-
bate over whether innovation is driven by consumer-driven “demand 
pull” or technologically determined “supply push” is based on something 
of a false dichotomy. Interestingly, these two frameworks can have very 
different implications for increased complexity. While an increase in in-
terdependencies can lead to an increase in module size in order to encap-
sulate more of them within a single module, an increase in the complexi-
ty of the external environment implies a decrease in module size in order 
to allow the system to better deal with the underlying variety. 
It is tempting to conclude that increases in demand heterogeneity 
can be met simply by increasing the number of modules and simplifying 
the interfaces connecting them.80 Dividing a system into a larger number 
of modules increases the number of possible product configurations 
combinatorially.81 Greater configurability has little value when demand is 
homogeneous, but increases in value as consumer preferences become 
more diverse.82 Variety also provides the most benefit when technologies 
are changing rapidly and the level of competition is intense,83 and pro-
vides fewer advantages when the technological and business environment 
is relatively stable.84 
As I shall later discuss in greater detail, this perspective ignores the 
fact that modularity promotes certain types of new product configura-
tions while inhibiting others.85 Modularity makes feasible innovations 
that involve new combinations or the improvement of existing modules. 
At the same time, predefining the relationship between certain clusters 
of tasks and the information passing between them forecloses innova-
tions that would recombine tasks in a fundamentally different way.86 The 
impact of modularity on product configuration is thus ambiguous. In-
creasing the number of modules thus only facilitates recombinations that 
“are compatible with the overall system architecture.”87 At the same 
                                                                                                                                         
 79. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (London, MacMillan 1890). 
 80. Orton & Weick, supra note 74, at 210 (noting that “registering [sources of variety] improves 
when elements become more numerous and the constraints among them weaken”). 
 81. Schilling, supra note 29, at 323. 
 82. Id. at 317, 324–25. 
 83. Melissa A. Schilling & H. Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational Forms: An 
Industry-Level Analysis, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149, 1162 (2001). 
 84. Langlois, supra note 10, at 23–24. 
 85. See infra Part IV.C. 
 86. See Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration 
of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 9, 11–13 
(1990) (distinguishing between changes in knowledge with respect to individual components and 
changes in architectural knowledge “about the ways in which the components are integrated and 
linked together into a coherent whole”). 
 87. Schilling, supra note 29, at 315. 
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time, it preempts recombinations that would reorganize the hierarchy in 
a different manner.88 
E. Testing and Integration 
Another essential element of any modular design is a means for 
testing and system integration.89 Because any initial modular design is 
necessarily incomplete, the architects of any modular system must pro-
vide some way to ensure that the system is functioning properly and that 
each module is functioning in accordance with the overall design.90 In-
deed, such tests constitute a necessary precondition to distributed pro-
duction systems in which different modules are produced by different 
firms. In the words of Baldwin and Clark, “The testable, verifiable di-
mensions of the module are the foundation that supports arm’s length-
contracts and market transactions.”91 Indeed, “without tests, there is no 
way to know what is being bought and sold.”92 
The need to test each possible state one module can occupy against 
every possible combination of states that other modules can occupy rep-
resents what Baldwin and Clark have called the “Achilles’ heel of modu-
lar designs.”93 Without modularity, this problem would have been far 
worse. Dijkstra’s seminal analysis concluded that under integrated, non-
modular architectures, “the number of ‘relevant states’ would have ex-
ploded to such a height that exhaustive testing would have been an illu-
sion.”94 The failure to limit the number of ways different components can 
interact with one another leads to a “combinatorial explosion of system 
variants.”95 
If the only available tests operate at the system level, architects can-
not escape the combinatorial explosion of states that must be tested 
against one another.96 Thus, when system-level tests are the only option, 
designers inevitably tend towards unmodularized, integrated designs and 
low levels of experimentation.97 The exponential nature of the combina-
torial explosion means that this problem cannot be overcome simply by 
making system-level testing more rapid and less expensive.98 
The situation is quite different when tests can be conducted on indi-
vidual modules. Restricting the number of interdependencies and the 
number of states associated with those interdependencies that other 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. Kim B. Clark, The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological 
Evolution, 14 RES. POL’Y 235, 249 (1985). 
 89. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 72, 77, 246. 
 90. Id. at 70–72, 77. 
 91. Id. at 380 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 272. 
 94. Dijkstra, supra note 23, at 344. 
 95. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 273–75. 
 96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 97. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 275. 
 98. Id. at 276. 
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parts of the system must take into account dramatically reduces the 
number of combinations that must be tested.99 Module-level testing per-
mits the evaluation of individual modules against the module metrics in-
herent in the design rather than the entire universe of possible combina-
tions.100 Later studies have confirmed this insight, showing that the cost of 
testing grows sublinearly with the number of physical elements for modu-
lar architectures, whereas the cost of testing grows exponentially for in-
tegrated architectures.101 
The presence of robust module-level testing is thus a necessary pre-
condition for any modular system in which different firms produce dif-
ferent components. Indeed, the ability to verify that each module is 
working as envisioned by the architecture is a necessary condition to 
third-party, distributed production of modular components.102 Over time, 
new design rules are created to address the out-of-module interdepend-
encies revealed by the testing. Eventually, the design rules may become 
so complete that testing and system integration can be conducted by the 
module designers and end users or may even disappear.103 At this point, 
the architects will have modularized themselves out of a job.104 
III. THE BENEFITS OF MODULARITY 
It is widely recognized that modular architectures provide a number 
of benefits. Dividing the overall system into a series of subsystems makes 
complexity more manageable. It accelerates innovation by allowing ex-
periments on different parts of the system to proceed in parallel. It facili-
tates the division of labor across different work groups and firms. It in-
creases value by allowing the postponement of key technical decisions. 
Lastly, it promotes flexibility by allowing individual modules to be 
changed without disturbing the other parts of the complex system. 
A. Making Complexity More Manageable 
Breaking down complex systems into subparts helps make them 
more manageable. As an initial matter, partitioning a large system into 
smaller modules divides the larger task into subtasks “small enough to be 
fully comprehend[ed] by a single individual.”105 In this manner, modulari-
ty allows architects to work on individual modules in isolation without 
having to grapple with the architecture as a whole.106 Conversely, an ar-
                                                                                                                                         
 99. Id. at 277–79. 
 100. Id. at 277–78. 
 101. Christoph H. Loch et al., Parallel and Sequential Testing of Design Alternatives, 45 MGMT. 
SCI. 663, 673 (2001). 
 102. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 380. 
 103. Id. at 77, 250, 268. 
 104. Id. at 268–69. 
 105. Blanchette, supra note 11, at 1046. 
 106. Parnas, supra note 30, at 1054, 1056. 
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chitect can understand the overall system without having to understand 
the details of every module.107 
Moreover, the fact that the design architecture predetermines the 
relationships between modules makes the elements and functions of 
complex systems easier to describe and understand.108 One needs to know 
only the design rules defining the interactions with adjacent modules.109 
The details of the interactions contained within modules can be ignored 
without losing any relevant information.110 Moreover, reducing the total 
number of interdependencies and organizing them in systematic, predict-
able ways yields particularly strong benefits in reducing the cost of test-
ing programs. 
B. Enabling the Division of Labor Across Work Groups and Firms 
Modularity also has major organizational implications. As Parnas 
noted in his seminal analysis on information hiding, modularity allows 
“separate groups [to] work on each module with little need for commu-
nication.”111 Richard Langlois and Paul Robertson similarly note how 
modularity facilitates the division of labor by enabling autonomous inno-
vation that requires little coordination among modules.112 Intermodule 
coordination is enforced not by managerial authority, but rather by the 
implicit relationships embedded in the module interfaces without the 
need for hierarchy of managerial authority.113 It is the information struc-
tures embedded in the interfaces that bind the parts of the modular ar-
chitecture together.114 
The same independence that permits modules to be developed by 
separate work groups also facilitates their development by different 
firms.115 Because the coordination is embedded in the information struc-
ture of the architecture, firms can jointly organize tasks without being 
subject to common managerial authority.116 Moreover, the existence of 
                                                                                                                                         
 107. See Parnas et al., supra note 54, at 410. 
 108. See Simon, supra note 16, at 477. 
 109. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 91 (“The design rules are the visible infor-
mation . . . .”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Parnas, supra note 30, at 1054. 
 112. Richard N. Langlois & Paul L. Robertson, Networks and Innovation in a Modular System: 
Lessons from the Microcomputer and Stereo Component Industries, 21 RES. POL’Y 297, 302 (1992). 
 113. Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in 
Product and Organization Design, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 64–66, 73 (1996). 
 114. Id. at 66. 
 115. See Baldwin & Clark, supra note 8, at 84–85; Langlois, supra note 10; Sanchez & Mahoney, 
supra note 113; Schilling & Steensma, supra note 83; Karl Ulrich, The Role of Product Architecture in 
the Manufacturing Firm, 24 RES. POL’Y 419, 435 (1995); cf. Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 172 
(noting that firms may not have sufficient internal variety to permit sufficient experimentation). For 
more cautious appraisals, see Stefano Brusoni, The Limits to Specialization: Problem Solving and Co-
ordination in “Modular Networks”, 26 ORG. STUD 1885 (2005); Stefano Brusoni & Andrea Prencipe, 
Unpacking the Black Box of Modularity: Technologies, Products and Organizations, 10 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 179 (2001); Glenn Hoetker, Do Modular Products Lead to Modular Organizations?, 
27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 501 (2006).  
 116. Sanchez & Mahoney, supra note 113, at 64, 66–68. 
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modules separated by predefined interfaces not only allows development 
of different modules by different firms; it also creates more entry points 
for new firms, which in turn can promote greater competition.117 
The interdependency-oriented theory of modularity is closely relat-
ed to, but analytically distinct from, Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm.118 
Coase argued that firms decide whether to perform certain functions in-
ternally or to contract them out by comparing the cost of negotiating a 
contract to outsource the function with the cost of monitoring and over-
seeing the performance of the function internally.119 Modularity theory 
adopts a similar logic, but focuses on the costs of coordination and test-
ing, with highly interdependent tasks being performed within a single 
module (and thus within a single firm) and highly independent tasks be-
ing performed by different modules (and thus potentially by different 
firms intermediated by a transaction).120 The key difference is that trans-
action costs are potentially technologically defeasible and tend to decline 
over time. The complexities of testing multiple states are more funda-
mental and unlikely to dissipate with changes in technology. 
From this perspective, the relevant primitive units of analysis are 
not transactions, but rather tasks and their interdependencies.121 Indeed, 
it is the underlying task structure that determines the firm’s boundaries, 
rather than considerations such as bounded rationality, uncertainty, vul-
nerability to opportunism, and information asymmetry that motivate 
transaction cost economics.122 Indeed, particularly dense areas of interde-
pendencies can create “transaction-free zones” that are best encapsulat-
ed within corporations.123 This in turn creates what some have called a 
“modularity theory of the firm” in which “[f]irms arise as islands of non-
modularity in a sea of modularity.”124 
Modularity theory thus represents a return to a more technological 
vision of the theory of the firm, in which the scope of a firm is deter-
mined by the interconnections between steps in the production process.125 
This approach responds to the criticism that transaction cost economics 
                                                                                                                                         
 117. Langlois & Robertson, supra note 112, at 301. 
 118. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2189, 2205 (2012). 
 119. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937). 
 120. Langlois, supra note 10, at 32–34. 
 121. Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the 
Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155, 156, 162–63 (2007). 
 122. Id. at 163. 
 123. Id. at 181–83. 
 124. Langlois, supra note 10, at 34. 
 125. Perhaps the prototypical example is vertical integration in the steel industry to take ad-
vantage of thermal efficiencies, in which the integration of refining ore into ingot and then recasting 
ingot into forms obviated the need to reheat the molten metal. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID 
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 94 (3d ed. 1980); George J. 
Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1942). 
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“focuses on the conditions of exchange, to the neglect of the conditions 
of production.”126 
C. Promoting Flexibility 
In addition to making complexity more manageable, decomposing 
the larger system into subsystems that interact with one another in pre-
defined ways allows designers working on each subsystem to focus exclu-
sively on the aspect of the problem to which they have been assigned and 
ignore all other aspects. As Simon pointed out, “Decomposing [a com-
plex structure] into semi-independent components corresponding to its 
many functional parts” permits “[t]he design of each component [to] be 
carried out with some degree of independence of the design of the oth-
ers, since each will affect the others largely through its function and  
independently of the details of the mechanisms that accomplish the  
function.”127 
The limitation of intermodule interdependencies also facilitates in-
novation by making it possible to modify individual modules without 
worrying unduly about the impact of those changes on the other parts of 
the system. Because tasks related to information hidden inside a module 
necessarily cannot affect other modules, those tasks can be modified 
without affecting other modules or having to inform them about those 
modifications.128 As long as the interfaces remain stable and the number 
of interactions remain carefully constrained, software designers can 
change individual modules with a manageable amount of testing.129 This 
should be true with respect both to changes to individual modules and to 
replacements of entire modules with new modules.130 
The relative isolation of individual modules makes it easier to in-
corporate better solutions without having to make changes to the entire 
system.131 At the same time, the intramodule flexibility provided by mod-
ularity accommodates uncertainty by making it easier to incorporate sub-
sequent improvements into the system.132 Modularity facilitates experi-
mentation because any disturbances that may arise from any changes can 
be localized and analyzed within a single module,133 which buffers the 
overall system against ripple effects associated with subsequent chang-
es.134 The greater flexibility allows the network to evolve in response to 
new technological developments.135 
                                                                                                                                         
 126. Michael G. Jacobides & Sidney G. Winter, The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and Transaction 
Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 395, 398 (2005). 
 127. SIMON, supra note 44, at 73. 
 128. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 73; Parnas, supra note 30, at 1054. 
 129. Parnas et al., supra note 54, at 409. 
 130. Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 164. 
 131. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 91. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 142; Sanchez & Mahoney, supra note 113, at 64–65. 
 134. Orton & Weick, supra note 74, at 214. 
 135. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 216. 
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D. Facilitating Parallel Experimentation 
Modularity not only permits certain technological decisions to be 
postponed. It also allows experiments with different technical solutions 
to be conducted simultaneously in parallel.136 This not only reduces the 
time needed to complete the design of the complex system.137 Isolating 
each module from the effects of other modules means that “its value is 
no longer hostage to that of distant elements of the system” and that 
“[a]s a result, each module becomes an independent unit of selection and 
a point of potential value creation within the overall system.”138 
One of the primary virtues in segmenting tasks in this manner is that 
the relative independence between modules allows them to be developed 
simultaneously in parallel.139 Simultaneous experimentation with various 
alternative approaches increases the rate of learning by trial and error.140 
Although parallel testing proceeds more rapidly than serial testing, it 
does forego the benefits of learning between tests, which can increase the 
number of tests performed. Running multiple concurrent experiments 
through parallel testing nonetheless remains favored when learning from 
test to test is minimal and when testing is slow, inexpensive, or  
imperfect.141 
The existence of multiple dimensions along which a design can be 
improved technologically unlocks the value identified by real option the-
ory. When potential technological improvements arise for systems that 
consist of a single, interconnected design, the architect only has a single 
decision: whether to adopt the improvement or not.142 
Modular designs create many more options. At a minimum, they 
create as many options as there are modules.143 In addition, the architect 
can combine improvements and nonimprovements to different modules 
in different ways. This in turn creates a myriad of possible trajectories for 
the system.144 
Consider, for example, a two-module system. Instead of a binary 
choice between incorporation of the new technology into the intercon-
nected system, modularity raises the possibility of partial adoption, that 
is, adoption with respect to module A, but not B, or vice versa. In this 
sense, dividing an interconnected system into two modules increases the 
number of options from two to four. By extension, a three-module design 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. Id. at 91, 238. 
 137. See id. at 91; accord Parnas, supra note 30, at 1054 (noting that under modularity, “develop-
ment time should be shortened because separate groups would work on each module with little need 
for communication”); see also Simon, supra note 16, at 473 (observing how the existence of stable in-
termediate forms can cause complex systems to evolve more rapidly). 
 138. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 237. 
 139. See id. at 91; Ulrich, supra note 115, at 435; see also Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 160 
(noting that “modularity offers the advantage of parallelism”). 
 140. Langlois & Robertson, supra note 112, at 301. 
 141. Loch et al., supra note 101, at 664, 674. 
 142. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 236, 238, 252. 
 143. Id. at 236. 
 144. Id. at 238. 
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yields eight options. In other words, as the number of modules (n) in-
creases linearly, the number of options increases exponentially (2n). This 
approach assumes that the modularizations are symmetric, but the analy-





Modularity not only increases the number of options; it increases 
their value. Note first that if an architect had to accept both positive and 
negative values, the expected value of any experiment would be zero. 
But an architect can simply fail to incorporate the value of an experiment 
into the design. Thus, all positive experiments have a positive impact on 
value, while all negative experiments have no effect at all. The net result 
of cutting off the left-hand tail of the distribution means that the average 
experiment would have positive value. A simple calculation of the area 
under the positive half of the curve indicates that the expected value is 
0.3989 times the standard deviation, σ.145 
Baldwin and Clark’s model also assumes that the variance increases 
as the system becomes more complex, with variance increasing linearly 
with the number of modules n (i.e., variance nn
22 σσ = ). Because the 
standard deviation is by definition the square root of the variance, the 
standard deviation equals nσ .146 This has the effect of widening the dis-
tribution of possible outcomes, increasing both the number of high value 
and low value possibilities. In the case of the IBM System/360, dividing 
the system into twenty-five modules increased the value of the system by 
five times. 
The value is increased still further if multiple experiments are run 
with respect to each of the modules. In effect, each of these experiments 
is a random draw on the same distribution of expected value for each 
module, with only the one with the highest value being incorporated into 
the design. The existence of these multiple draws increases the likelihood 
that the best experiment will be significantly higher than the expected  
result. 
                                                                                                                                         
 145. Id. at 256. 
 146. See id. at 255. 
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In essence, enabling multiple experiments taps into Robert Mer-
ton’s key insight into the value of options, which is that a portfolio of op-
tions is more valuable than an option on a portfolio.147 Indeed, experi-
mentation increased the value of the IBM System/360 by an additional 
five times, which means that combining modularity with experimentation 
increased the value of the IBM System/360 by twenty-five times.148 
Whether this would be profitable depends on whether the increase  
in value exceeds the fixed costs of modularization and the cost of  
experimentation. 
E. Enabling Permissionless Innovation 
Modularity has the additional advantage of making innovation per-
missionless.149 Encapsulating certain parameters within modules permits 
innovators to innovate with respect to those hidden parameters without 
disturbing the rest of the system.150 Control is maintained by the design 
rules embedded in the architecture rather than by any firm or actor. Any 
person can connect as long as they comply with the design rules.151 In 
short, the architecture is set up so that hidden-module designers—
designers of components that are completely encapsulated within a mod-
ule—“do not have to have detailed knowledge about the whole system 
under development. Hidden-module designers have only to master the 
design rules.”152 
This permits module designers to act independently of the system 
architects as well as one another.153 This in turn enables decentralized de-
cisionmaking without causing the system to lose coordination.154 Modu-
larity also means that those who wish to experiment at the module level 
do not need to obtain permission from the system designers before doing 
so.155 The would-be module experimenters need only make sure that their 
module revisions comply with the design rules of the architecture.156 The 
result is to disperse and decentralize the process of innovation. It also has 
the effect of moving the options from the center of the system of the 
modules.157 This in turn shifts the value gained from those experiments 
from the center of the system to the modules.158 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Id. at 259. 
 148. Id. at 207–211. 
 149. Id. at 14, 223, 252, 264, 268, 336–37, 347–48. 
 150. Id. at 348. 
 151. Id. at 268, 306. 
 152. Id. at 348. 
 153. Id. at 348. 
 154. Id. at 268. 
 155. Id. at 14 (“No architect had to give permission for these changes to take place; the possibili-
ties were inherent in the modularity of the design itself.”); accord id. at 223, 268. 
 156. Id. at 268, 306. 
 157. Id. at 268. 
 158. Id.  
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IV. MODULARITY’S LATENT COSTS 
Although modularity yields substantial benefits, it should not be re-
garded as a panacea. On the contrary, an early IETF document authored 
by MIT computer scientist and then-chief protocol architect David Clark 
observed that network engineers are often unpleasantly surprised to find 
that “modularity is one of the chief villains in attempting to obtain good 
performance.”159 This statement underscores the importance of under-
standing the implicit tradeoffs underlying every modularity decision. 
A. The Sunk Costs of Modularization 
The production of a modular system takes place in three distinct 
phases. During the first stage, the architects formulate the design rules 
that determine the scope of the modules and what information to make 
visible in the interfaces through which each module will interact with the 
others. During the second stage, smaller groups engage in independent 
parallel activity to develop the modules. During the third stage, the vari-
ous modules are tested and integrated into a single system.160 
One of the most straightforward costs of modularity results from the 
need to construct and disseminate a modular design up front. Such ef-
forts can be extremely time consuming and demanding.161 The presence 
of the initial design phase makes “modular systems . . . much more diffi-
cult to design than comparable interconnected systems.”162 The architects 
must know a great deal about the relevant products and processes and 
the interdependencies in the relevant tasks and must incorporate their 
insights into design rules specified long in advance.163 The cost of devel-
oping these design principles represents a sunk-cost investment that must 
be recouped.164 Moreover, the inevitable uncertainty about the design 
necessarily means that some chance always remains that the architecture 
is badly done, in which case it will underperform.165 
B. Restrictions on Cost Minimization 
Beyond the sunk costs of creating the architecture, modularity em-
bodies a more fundamental tradeoff. The generality of modular systems 
makes them flexible, but increases their costs. Consider, for example, the 
problem of packing as many objects into a closet as possible.166 The most 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. David D. Clark, Modularity and Efficiency in Protocol Implementation 1 (Request for Com-
ments 817, July 1982) [hereinafter RFC 817], available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc817. 
 160. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 72. 
 161. Id. at 86, 247; Baldwin & Clark, supra note 30, at 199; Langlois, supra note 10, at 23. 
 162. Baldwin & Clark, supra note 8, at 86. 
 163. Id. 
 164. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 247; accord Langlois, supra note 10, at 23 (noting that 
despite modularity’s benefits, “there is no free lunch” in that “[a] well-decomposed modular system 
must pay a kind of fixed cost that an integrated system need not pay”). 
 165. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 254, 257; Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 172. 
 166. The example is taken from Blanchette, supra note 11, at 1047. 
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efficient way to do so would be to place each object in the closet one at a 
time, carefully taking into account the idiosyncrasies of each object’s 
shape. The problem is that the interdependencies between the objects 
mean that any attempt to retrieve or shift the objects after they have 
been packed in will threaten to perturb the entire arrangement. A classic 
solution to this problem would be to pack all of the objects into storage 
bins before placing them in the closet. The bins would make the objects 
easier to shift, but would store the items less efficiently on account of the 
empty space in each of the bins and any gaps left between the bins when 
packing them into the closet. 
The same cost/flexibility tradeoff arises with respect to modulari-
ty.167 As Baldwin and Clark note, the benefits of modularity must be 
traded off against the fact that “designers will lose the ability to explore 
some parts of the space of designs—in effect, the architects will restrict 
the search, declaring some parts of the design space to be out of 
bounds.”168 The problem, long recognized by computer scientists, is that 
generality exacts a cost. For example, McGee’s seminal paper on gener-
alization is based on the premise that handtailored programs, while ex-
pensive to create and modify, are usually more cost effective (which 
computer scientists describe using the word, “efficient”).169 Philip Agre 
notes that “all abstractions . . . entail[] a decrease in efficiency,” provid-
ing one example “located at the extreme in the space of trade-offs be-
tween freedom of abstraction and efficiency of implementation” which 
“offer[ed] a maximum of freedom with a minimum of efficiency” as well 
as another example that presented “the trade-off between efficiency of 
implementation and freedom of abstraction in its most radical form.”170 
Another commentator has similarly noted that “the more a language’s 
constructs abstract away from the underlying physical machine, the less 
efficient the resulting code tends to be.”171 
The tradeoff between flexibility and generality provides insights in-
to when the benefits of modularity exceed the costs. As noted earlier, 
modularity yields the most benefits when demand is heterogeneous, 
technology is changing rapidly, and competition is intense.172 These con-
siderations affect not just whether to modularize, but also how to modu-
larize. For example, increasing the number of modules increases testing 
expense, as tiny modules can cause a combinatorial explosion of testing 
permutations.173 Sendil Ethiraj and Daniel Levinthal develop an interest-
ing model integrating these considerations, which trades off the destabi-
lizing effects from having too many modules against the slower rate of 
                                                                                                                                         
 167. See KARL T. ULRICH & STEVEN D. EPPINGER, PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 202 
(5th ed. 2011); Blanchette, supra note 11, at 1048. 
 168. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 68–69. 
 169. McGee, supra note 44, at 2. 
 170. PHILIP AGRE, COMPUTATION AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE 68, 73, 76 (1997). 
 171. Blanchette, supra note 11, at 1047. 
 172. See supra Part II.D. 
 173. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 272, 275; Loch et al., supra note 101, at 673. 
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innovation from having too few modules. They show that creating more 
modules unlocks parallelism and avoids premature fixation on inferior 
designs, but leads to more intermodule interdependencies and requires 
more testing.174 Although they tested multiple scenarios,175 their general 
conclusion is that having too many modules poses greater risks than hav-
ing too few.176 
C. Restriction of Certain Types of Innovation 
Decisions about how to implement modularity may affect applica-
tions differently.177 To use an example from software design, the process 
for releasing memory that is no longer needed can require all programs 
to stop temporarily, a burden that will rest particularly heavily on real-
time applications.178 
Decisions about what information to hide and what information to 
make visible can also have a differential impact on applications. The set 
of visible information necessarily has a direct impact on the functionality 
of the system. Because it naturally limits the type of information that can 
pass between modules, any functionality that depends on any other in-
formation must be handled within one particular module. Consequently, 
modularization represents a precommitment to the idea that certain 
functions must be performed by certain modules. At the same time, it re-
flects a judgment of the type of functions that require coordination 
across modules. 
The advent of USB ports to connect printers to personal computers 
provides a useful example. The interface between these two devices is 
designed to include the minimum amount of information that must pass 
between these two modules. Many aspects about printers are extremely 
dependent on whether laser printing, inkjet printing, or some other tech-
nology is used, the volume of the printer, and other key design decisions. 
Information hiding allows these interdependencies to be encapsulated 
within the printer so that the personal computers connected to those 
printers do not need to know anything about how any particular printer 
solves those functions. As long as the personal computer presents its data 
in accordance with the appropriate format, the printer should function 
properly. In addition, as long as printers are prepared to process the visi-
ble information presented by personal computers through the interface, 
they remain free to redesign any technical aspects that solely involve the 
hidden information. Note, however, that in limiting the information that 
                                                                                                                                         
 174. Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 160. 
 175. Ethiraj and Levinthal considered two types of innovation: internal (which they call local 
search) and borrowing modules from other companies (which they call recombination). They also 
compared the results when one assumed that the architects have the design perfect with the results 
when they do not. Id. at 160–61, 164–65. 
 176. Id. at 170–72. 
 177. See Blanchette, supra note 11, at 1047 (noting that “the trade-offs implied by modularity will 
not affect all applications equally, or even the same application under all circumstances”). 
 178. Id. 
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can pass between personal computers and printers, the design of the  
interface inevitably imposes limits on the ways these two devices can  
interact. 
Thus, although flexibility is generally regarded as one of the ad-
vantages of modular systems, closer inspection reveals that modular 
structures facilitate only certain types of innovation while impeding oth-
ers. Specifically, modular systems are very good at promoting improve-
ments and replacements of individual modules, which require little coor-
dination with other modules. They are less accommodating to systemic 
innovations that reorganize the ways that modules interact with one  
another.179 
The literature on design hierarchies suggests a similar conclusion.180 
Design hierarchies exist when innovations are not standalone technologi-
cal developments, but rather are part of a web of interdependent techno-
logical processes. Not all of the components of a design hierarchy are 
equally important. Some have a higher degree of connection to compo-
nents than others.181 
Commentators have recognized that design hierarchies represent 
something of a mixed blessing from the standpoint of innovation. On the 
one hand, they facilitate innovations that are consistent with the hierar-
chy. On the other hand, they discourage innovations that are inconsistent 
with the hierarchy.182 Thus, any innovation that restructures the way a de-
sign hierarchy operates must overcome the challenge of coordinating the 
behavior of multiple autonomous actors, each of which is pursuing its 
own agenda.183 This is particularly true for components of the design hi-
erarchy that are particularly tightly connected with other components.184 
Because changes to core components necessarily require extensive 
changes to peripheral components, even changes that ultimately prove 
successful in the long run are likely to be accompanied in the short run 
by poorer system performance and widespread institutional resistance.185 
                                                                                                                                         
 179. Langlois, supra note 10, at 25–26 (distinguishing between modular innovation, which takes 
place within modules, and architectural innovation, which changes the relationship between modules, 
and observing how an architecture can get stuck in an inferior modularization); Langlois & Robertson, 
supra note 140, at 302 (citing David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 288 (1986)). 
 180. For an earlier discussion, see Christopher S. Yoo, Product Life Cycle Theory and the Matura-
tion of the Internet, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 655–56 (2010). 
 181. Clark, supra note 88, at 243; Johann Peter Murmann & Koen Frenken, Toward a Systematic 
Framework for Research on Dominant Designs, Technological Innovations, and Industrial Change, 35 
RES. POL’Y 925, 940–42 (2006); Michael L. Tushman & Johann Peter Murmann, Dominant Designs, 
Technology Cycles, and Organizational Outcomes, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 231, 249–51 (1998); Michael 
L. Tushman & Lori Rosenkopf, Organizational Determinants of Technological Change: Toward a So-
ciology of Technological Evolution, 14 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 311, 334 (1992).  
 182. Clark, supra note 88, at 249. 
 183. Henry W. Chesbrough & David J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous? Organizing for Innova-
tion, 74 HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1996, at 65, 67–68; Jacobides & Winter, supra note 126, at 404. 
 184. Murmann & Frenken, supra note 181, at 942–43. 
 185. Id. at 942. 
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Empirical studies have confirmed that changes to core components are 
harder to displace.186 
Characterizing innovation as residing solely on the promodularity 
side of the tradeoff, as sometimes occurs in the literature, adopts an un-
necessarily narrow view.187 In terms of innovation, modularity is more 
properly regarded as something of a two-edged sword that simultaneous-
ly promotes innovations that are consistent with the architecture and ob-
structs innovations that require a different configuration of tasks. 
D. Limitations on Alternative Institutional Forms 
As discussed above, some scholars believe that “products design or-
ganizations”188 and that modular product designs necessarily lead to 
modular organizational designs.189 To the extent this is true, the fact that 
technological interdependencies determine the natural boundaries be-
tween modules prevents the segregation of certain tasks into different 
firms. The technological determinants of modularity thus restricts the ex-
tent to which designers can select module boundaries to promote compe-
tition and other economic considerations, as some have suggested. 190 
In addition, the decentralized, mix-and-match world of modularity 
exists in considerable tension with the insights of the New Institutional 
Economics. 
Consider the landmark article by David Teece exploring why the 
entrepreneurs who come up with innovative ideas often do not end up 
being the person who benefits the most from them.191 Teece pointed out 
that most innovations are not products by themselves. Instead, they must 
be combined with other complementary assets before they can form a 
marketable product.192 When that is the case, economic success depends 
as much on the ability to bargain effectively with owners of complemen-
tary assets as it does on having ironclad patent protection over the inno-
vation.193 
If the owners of the complementary assets are in a stronger bargain-
ing position, innovators may want to receive ex ante assurances before 
undertaking any irreversible investments that would be rendered value-
                                                                                                                                         
 186. E.g., Alan MacCormack et al., The Impact of Component Modularity on Design Evolution: 
Evidence from the Software Industry (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-038, 2007), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-038.pdf. 
 187. See, e.g., JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY 
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 75–88 (2012) (describing interoperability as promoting innovation while 
having negative effects on privacy and security); ZITTRAIN, supra note 3, at 40–43 (characterizing 
modularity as promoting generativity, but being vulnerable to security risks). 
 188. Sanchez & Mahoney, supra note 113, at 64. 
 189. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., David D. Clark et al., Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow’s Internet, 13 
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 462, 468–70 (2005). 
 191. David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Col-
laboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 285 (1986). 
 192. Id. at 288. 
 193. Id. at 291–92. 
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less if they are unable to reach agreement with the owner of the comple-
mentary asset.194 Under such circumstances, the classic solution is for the 
innovator and the owner to eliminate the risk that the other side may act 
opportunistically to claim a greater proportion of the surplus, either by 
merging with one another or by entering into a long-term contract.195 
Although such an arrangement would deviate from the mix-and-match 
world associated with modularity, it would promote entry by reducing 
the risk faced by innovating firms.196 
A similar insight emerges from the seminal article by Timothy 
Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg on GPTs.197 GPTs create positive 
vertical externalities for applications sectors that build products based on 
the GPT.198 The GPT creator, however, will invest based on a comparison 
of its private cost of the investment and its private return. The positive 
externality causes the GPT creator’s private benefit to understate the so-
cial benefit of further investments, which results in too little investment 
in GPTs. At the same time, allowing GPT creators to appropriate more 
of the surplus risks causing too little investment in the applications sec-
tor.199 The public goods aspect of GPTs thus creates a horizontal exter-
nality, as different applications-sector players attempt to induce their 
peers to bear more of the cost of financing improvements in the GPT. 
The obvious solution to both problems is to permit GPT creators and 
applications sector developers to merge or enter into some type of coop-
erative agreement that would allow the GPT creator to realize more the 
benefits of its investment.200 Preventing GPTs from coordinating with ap-
plications will result in “‘too little, too late’ innovation” in both sectors.201 
Both of these lines of research suggest permitting firms in modular 
spaces to experiment with alternative institutional forms could yield sig-
nificant benefits. Imposition of a modular structure may prevent these 
benefits from being realized. 
E. Lack of Coordination and Systemic Drift 
The decentralized nature of decisionmaking in modular industries 
can lead to welfare loss. As noted earlier, for distributed production of 
modules to succeed, each module needs to be able to verify that the oth-
er modules are performing as expected. Indeed, Baldwin and Clark re-
gard such testing standards to be an integral part of any modular de-
sign.202 In the context of the Internet, the necessary verification tools 
                                                                                                                                         
 194. Id. at 294. 
 195. See id. at 290, 293–95. 
 196. See id. at 302. 
 197. Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies: “Engines of 
Growth?”, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 85 (1995). 
 198. Id. at 94. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 96, 99. 
 201. Id. at 103. 
 202. See supra Part I.C. 
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simply do not exist. As discussed below, the visible information in the in-
terfaces does not provide enough information for actors to verify wheth-
er the other modules are behaving as expected. The absence of any way 
to verify the conduct of the other modules effectively leaves actors in the 
position of having to rely on the honor system or some form of informal 
sanctions.203 
Furthermore, local optimizing behavior may not maximize the per-
formance of the overall system. Complex systems have the general prop-
erty that “[i]f each subsystem, regarded separately, is made to operate 
with maximum efficiency, the system as a whole will not operate with 
utmost efficiency.”204 Consequently, because modularity focuses each 
module (and the owner of each module) on optimizing its individual in-
terests, the net result is unlikely to optimize the performance of the sys-
tem as a whole.205 
Moreover, given that all companies are drawing off a common pool 
of surplus that they jointly create, they have the incentive to want others 
to do more.206 As was the case with GPTs, this can lead to suboptimal in-
vestment in the entire modular ecosystem, as each actor hopes that the 
others will bear a greater proportion of the cost.207 
One solution would be to have some actor organize all of the activi-
ties of a modular system around the optimal outcome. The problem is 
that in a decentralized system, individual actors have no incentive to bear 
the costs of promoting what is best for the system as a whole.208 Indeed, 
many would regard centralized control as improper, and any actors who 
would be disadvantaged by such intervention would vigorously oppose it. 
The result is that many modular systems will suffer from a lack of 
coordination. Without such leadership, modular systems often undergo 
long periods of systemic drift. 
* * * 
The foregoing analysis makes clear that modularity is not always the 
optimal architecture. Whether modularity is optimal is contingent on a 
number of factors. Moreover, any modular scheme necessarily requires 
the system to give up a degree of functionality. Modularity can also inter-
                                                                                                                                         
 203. Charles L. Jackson, Wireless Efficiency Versus Net Neutrality, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 445, 448–
51 (2011). 
 204. LARS SKYTTNER, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: IDEAS AND APPLICATIONS 93 (2001). 
 205. See Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 183, at 66; Jon Crowcroft et al., Is Layering Harmful?, 6 
IEEE NETWORK MAG., 20, 23–24 (1992); John D. Day & Hubert Zimmerman, The OSI Reference 
Model, 71 PROC. IEEE 1334, 1335–36 (1983); Randy Bush & David Meyer, Some Internet Architectur-
al Guidelines and Philosophy 7–8 (Network Working Group Request for Comments 3439, Dec. 2002) 
[hereinafter RFC 3439], available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3439.  
 206. Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 183, at 67–69. 
 207. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Robert Braden et al., Developing a Next-Generation Internet Architecture 16 (Univ. of 
S. Cal. Info. Sci. Inst. White Paper, 2000) (introducing the NewArch project funded by the Defense 
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fere with alternative institutional arrangements that firms can use to ad-
dress unequal bargaining power or to internalize positive externalities. 
The foregoing analysis also underscores that modularity is not a 
static construct. Indeed, modularity theorists expect the design to change 
as the architects gain a better understanding of the underlying interde-
pendencies.209 Technological and economic changes can create pressure 
for high-tech industries to evolve toward a fundamentally different archi-
tecture.210 Examples include the desktop PC’s absorption of functions 
that used to be provided by standalone peripheral devices—such as hard 
disks, modems, and WiFi cards211—and the advent of last-mile broadband 
networks—such as DSL and cable modem systems—both of which un-
dercut the rationale for a standalone regional ISP.212 Changes in technol-
ogy and end-user demand for network services, however, can cause the 
nature and relative importance of particular interdependencies to change 
over time, which in turn creates pressure on the current modular archi-
tecture to change. Any such change not only involves transition costs,213 
but also any change in the location of transactions inherent in any such 
remodularization inevitably alters the structure of industries.214 In fact, 
the difficulty in analyzing how modularity changes in industries in the 
midst of such a period of ferment is what led Baldwin and Clark to divide 
their work into two volumes.215 
Attempts to evolve away from an existing modular architecture may 
thus represent nothing more than the natural response to changes in the 
economic and technological environment.216 Indeed, experimentation in 
                                                                                                                                         
 209. von Hippel, supra note 29, at 408, 412; Langlois, supra note 10, at 25. 
 210. See Baldwin, supra note 121, at 180 (noting that “there is no process of technological deter-
minism at work driving the task network toward ever-higher levels of modularity” and that changes in 
strategies, knowledge, and technologies can cause “task networks to become more integral (i.e., less 
modular) over time”); Jacobides & Winter, supra note 126, at 405 (noting how the emergence of new 
productive structures and new knowledge bases can cause the pattern of increasing specialization and 
vertical disintegration to reverse). 
 211. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382–83 (9th Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussing the increasing integration between the CPU and certain peripherals); Cal. Computer Prods., 
Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing how the IBM new computer inte-
grated the disk drive control function with the CPU); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 
448 F. Supp. 228, 231–32 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (describing how IBM abandoned removable disk drives in 
favor of non-removable drives with the head-disk assembly integrated into the computer itself that 
provided greater storage capacity), aff’d sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th 
Cir. 1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 341–342 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (describing how 
IBM integrated its memories and control units into its CPUs), rev’d on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 
(10th Cir. 1975).  
 212. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Broadband 
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 33–34 
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new standards and competition between standards are properly regarded 
as a sign of innovative health.217 
V. MODULARITY THEORY AND ARCHITECTURAL CHANGE 
The foregoing catalog of the pluses and minuses of modularity pro-
vide a basis for assessing the value of any particular modular system at 
any particular time. That said, this analytical framework views modular 
architectures as static and fails to explain how modular architectures 
emerge and, once having done so, when and how they evolve. The fact 
that the shape of any modular architecture is determined by technologi-
cal interdependencies on the supply side and by the heterogeneity of 
demand on the demand side indicates that the optimal architecture 
should change over time. 
The inevitability of architectural change underscores the need for a 
theory of remodularization218 as well as heuristics to help recognize when 
such change is necessary.219 Fortunately, Baldwin and Clark offer a theo-
ry built around six core modular operators that represent the entire set of 
possible transformations and which provide significant insights into how 
and when modular architectures can and should change. 
A. Modular Operators 
Baldwin and Clark identified six operators that can transform a 
modular architecture: splitting, substitution, augmentation, exclusion, in-
version, and porting.220 The first two (splitting and substitution) can occur 
in nonmodular systems, while the other four can occur only in modular 
systems.221 Moreover, five of the operators represent relatively minor 
changes to the architecture. Only inversion requires a fundamental reor-
dering of the relevant tasks. 
1. Splitting and Substitution 
Consider splitting, which is the division of one module into two.222 
As noted earlier, splitting is not unique to modular architectures; indeed, 
it is how an interconnected architecture (which essentially consists of one 
module) becomes modular in the first place.223 These modules can in turn 
                                                                                                                                         
 217. See Shane Greenstein, Glimmers and Signs of Innovative Health in the Commercial Internet, 
8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 25, 42–55 (2010) (discussing how economic experimentation and 
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 218. Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 172 (noting that “we need to model the evolution of 
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 219. Stefano Brusoni & Andrea Prencipe, A Dialectical Model of Organizational Loose Cou-
pling: Modularity, Systems Integration, and Innovation 5 (June 27, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.druid.dk/uploads/tx_picturedb/ds2005-1543.pdf. 
 220. BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 5, at 123, 132–42, 228. 
 221. Id. at 123, 136. 
 222. Id. at 123. 
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split again. Substitution is the replacement of one module design for an-
other.224 Baldwin and Clark see splitting and substitution as part of a cy-
cle, which begins with splitting into two modules, followed by substitu-
tion of new technologies for particular modules, followed again by 
splitting as the benefits from further substitution begin to abate.225 
Splitting, however, imposes only a relatively small change to a mod-
ular architecture. Because it by definition only affects the internal design 
structure of what had originally been one module in the system, it does 
not disturb the relationship with other modules or any of the information 
visible to other modules. 
Substitution similarly does not disrupt the basic architecture at all. 
Indeed, the whole point of modularity is to swap out existing modules 
without affecting the internal workings of the other modules. Although 
substitution does improve the system, because it operates on only the 
hidden information, it does so in a way that does not disturb the basic ar-
chitecture of the overall system. 
2. Exclusion and Augmentation 
Two other operators, exclusion and augmentation, together form 
part of a strategy that makes sense when users do not need all of the 
modules that are available or when designing the full set of possible 
modules is too costly at the time of launch.226 When that is the case, the 
designer can reduce development costs by designing a narrow architec-
ture (exclusion), and then expanding it after it is validated by customers 
(augmentation).227 This permits the designer to conserve resources by de-
ferring investments in additional functionality until the system has been 
validated by the marketplace. If the system is successful, the designers 
can commit additional resources to developing other parts of the system 
with greater impunity.228 
The designers of the initial, minimal system must design it with fu-
ture augmentation in mind. The key is design rules with clean interfaces 
that provide a large “shadow set” of potential new modules that can be 
created through augmentation.229 If so, those who wish to augment the 
architecture need only understand how to fit the new module within the 
shadow design rules.230 
Designing an architecture to support exclusion and augmentation in 
effect requires the virtual design of a more complete architecture that or-
ganizes the relationship between current and future models. The differ-
ence is primarily one of timing. In the case of complete architecture, all 
                                                                                                                                         
 224. Id. at 123, 281. 
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 226. Id. at 136, 308, 310. 
 227. Id. at 308. 
 228. Id. at 136–37, 313–14. 
 229. Id. at 321. 
 230. Id. at 306. 
YOO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2016 1:26 PM 
No. 1] MODULARITY THEORY AND INTERNET REGULATION 35 
of the costs are committed up front. In the case of an architecture nar-
rowed by exclusion in anticipation of future expansion through augmen-
tation, many of these costs can be postponed. In this sense, the process of 
creating a complete architecture and a minimal architecture susceptible 
to later augmentation both require conceptualizing and enforcing a co-
herent architecture up front. If the initial minimal architecture is de-
signed properly, subsequent augmentation does not cause any disruption 
to the design. In fact, the possibility of augmentation opens the door to 
coinvestment by other firms.231 All these third parties need to do is look 
to the same set of visible information envisioned by the architects.232 
3. Porting and Inversion 
The final two modular operators effect more substantial architec-
tural changes. Porting occurs when a module is made available to anoth-
er modular system, such as when a printer made for one operating sys-
tem is adapted to work with another. The process requires creating a 
shell around the module with a translator capable of conforming to the 
design rules of both systems.233 If done properly, porting has no impact on 
the old architecture. Indeed, architects and designers of modules of the 
other system may not know that porting has taken place.234 
The most interesting modular operator for purposes of this Article 
is inversion. Inversion “tak[es] previously hidden information and 
mov[es] it up the design hierarchy so that it is visible to a group of mod-
ules.”235 For example, printing subroutines used to be buried inside pro-
grams, with each program including its own unique implementation tai-
lored to its program that was part of that program’s hidden information 
and thus locked inside it. Over time, the fact that many programs use 
printing made it logical to move printing subroutines to a higher level of 
the design hierarchy to a place where it is visible to all other programs.236 
“[T]hrough inversion, what was hidden becomes visible.”237 
What began as a module inside another module is treated as a 
common solution and imposed on other programs.238 It occurs when the 
value of the new architecture exceeds the sum of the cost of designing the 
new architecture, the cost of redesigning the hidden modules that previ-
ously relied on the new inverted module that used to be locked inside a 
                                                                                                                                         
 231. Id. at 321–22. 
 232. Id. at 322. 
 233. Id. at 140. 
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module, and the lost net option value that would have accrued if experi-
ments under the old architecture had been permitted to continue.239 
By its nature, inversion represents a significant change that requires 
fundamental changes in the task structure.240 As such, they are often 
highly controversial.241 They take away designers’ prerogatives over pre-
viously hidden information that was previously locked within a module, 
and thus subject to experimentation, and freezes it into the visible infor-
mation that is part of the new design.242 Indeed, inversion terminates all 
further experiments with respect to the previously hidden information 
that inversion makes visible.243 Moreover, they require that adjacent 
modules now interact with a different set of visible information. They al-
so require designers to adapt to a new set of rules and to develop a new 
set of skills.244 
That said, inversions occupy a natural place in the life cycle of a 
modular regime. The creation of a new modular architecture will prompt 
a rash of experimentation. The returns yielded by these experiments will 
diminish over time. Eventually, the benefits from further experimenta-
tion no longer justify the cost, at which point pressure will mount for a 
new set of design rules through inversion.245 
B. Obstacles to Significant Architectural Change 
The conventional wisdom is that modern technologies are undergo-
ing constant and rapid change, sometimes reflected in the term “Internet 
time.”246 Closer inspection reveals the phrase only to be half true. While 
modularity permits rapid innovation with respect to individual modules, 
changes in the architecture that structure the interactions among those 
modules occur glacially slowly.247 Indeed, this stability is critical to the 
success of modular systems, since it provides those who are testing modu-
lar innovations with the fixed reference points around which to base their 
products as well as the expectation of being able to capitalize on any im-
provements that prove successful. And architectures that have been es-
tablished are notoriously hard to change.248 
This means that modular architectures are effective at promoting 
innovations that are consistent with the existing stack, such as substitu-
tion and to a lesser extent splitting, exclusion, and augmentation. At the 
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same time, they tend to hinder innovations that require a reorganization 
of the tasks performed by the stack through an operator such as inver-
sion. 
One part of this slow rate of architectural change stems from coor-
dination problems. The literature on network economic effects has long 
recognized how the presence of an installed base can delay the adoption 
of a new technology even when that technology is superior.249 The prob-
lems are likely to be more severe in a modular architecture, since chang-
es to the architecture would require the coordination with the modules 
both above and below the modules being inverted.250 As a result, some 
scholars have raised the concern that modular architectures may be un-
duly resistant to this type of change.251 This resistance may lead firms to 
abandon modular architectures in favor of more vertically integrated 
market structures.252 
The literature on innovation has long recognized how each architec-
ture creates its own technological paradigm that identifies the problems 
worth solving and the solutions that are the most promising.253 As noted 
earlier, one key aspect of modularity is that it allows organizations to fo-
cus their attention on individual modules and to disregard the system as a 
whole.254 Ironically, the same quality that reduces complexity makes or-
ganizations less attentive to potential architectural changes. In addition, 
a modular architecture establishes a technical agenda for a product’s de-
velopment that directs research along innovation avenues consistent with 
the hierarchy.255 Each modular architecture thus creates its own evolu-
tionary trajectory.256 These paradigms, moreover, become ingrained in 
the communication channels and information filters that organizations 
use to manage information, which tends to further reinforce the status 
quo.257 Admittedly, these problems are worse for nonmodular systems,258 
but they exist for modular systems as well. 
These considerations suggest that casting modularity as a tradeoff 
between long-term evolvability and short-run inefficiency paints an in-
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complete picture.259 Instead, the differences between modular and archi-
tectural innovation suggest that there are evolvability considerations on 
both sides of the equation. 
Moreover, the nature of the two types of innovation is also likely to 
be different. While innovation with respect to individual modules is like-
ly to be very rapid, it is also likely to be incremental and consider only 
possibilities permitted by the existing architecture. The best it can 
achieve is to reflect the local maximum permitted by the existing  
architecture.260 
Architectural innovation has the opposite characteristics: while very 
slow, the freedom to consider all possibilities, including those incon-
sistent with the current architecture, makes it more likely to make a 
sharply discontinuous jump to a completely different local optimum.261 If 
the value of this other optimum is sufficiently large, architectural innova-
tion can yield benefits that more than compensate for the speed ad-
vantage enjoyed by modular innovation.262 Indeed, in contrast to the con-
ventional wisdom, which holds that rapid technological change favors 
modularity, the greater potential of nonmodular architectures to take 
advantage of major technological developments suggests volatility actu-
ally favors the latter.263 
The modularity literature also helps provide intuitions about 
whether change is likely to occur too quickly or too slowly. Several con-
siderations suggest the latter. For example, the sunk costs associated with 
remodularization create the risk of path dependence that causes the sys-
tem to become locked into an inferior modularization.264 That said, as 
noted earlier, the value of modularity depends on having a significant 
degree of stability. Moreover, architectural change is very expensive.265 
Circumstances thus may exist when the magnitude of the benefits do not 
justify the cost.266 
To say that the architecture should change only rarely is not to say 
that it should never do so. The fact that the optimal modular architecture 
is largely a function of technical considerations and demand characteris-
tics implies that optimal architecture will be dynamic in the long run267 
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and that modular architectures may need to undergo remodularization 
from time to time.268 
Accordingly, modularity theory provides a theory of architectural 
change, along with reasons to suspect that such change may be too long 
in coming. The power of this analytical framework will be explored 
through the case studies presented in the next Part. 
VI. POLICY APPLICATIONS 
Modularity theory provides a number of insights into many recent 
and current policy issues. These include unbundling under the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, network neutrality, calls for opening Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces (“APIs”) for platforms such as the iPhone 
and Twitter, and proposals for clean-slate redesigns of the network  
architecture. 
A. Unbundling of Local Telephone Networks 
Starting first with an example from the traditional telephone net-
work, perhaps the key regulatory innovation of the past several decades 
is the requirement that incumbent providers offer unbundled access to all 
of the elements of their networks. The FCC articulated the seminal un-
bundling requirement as part of its Computer Inquiries,269 which arose 
when local telephone companies began to move beyond offering tradi-
tional voice communications (which the FCC called basic services) to of-
fer voicemail, caller ID, Internet access, and other new advanced services 
that combined the transport of communications with computer pro-
cessing, storage, or interaction with stored information (which the FCC 
called enhanced services).270 
The second Computer Inquiry attempted to prevent large local tele-
phone companies from favoring their own enhanced service offerings by 
requiring them to provide enhanced services through a separate subsidi-
ary and to offer all enhanced service providers the same access to their 
transport infrastructure.271 The FCC became concerned that mandating 
such a high degree of vertical disintegration was preventing new services 
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from appearing.272 As a result, the Third Computer Inquiry created a re-
gime where local telephone companies could avoid the separate subsidi-
ary requirement if they provided unbundled access to their networks on 
an element-by-element basis.273 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 extended unbundling to every 
incumbent local telephone company.274 Requiring incumbents to provide 
access to all of their network elements on an unbundled basis was the 
centerpiece of Congress’ landmark effort to stimulate competition in lo-
cal telephone service. The unbundling requirement imposed by the 1996 
Act did include one key limitation. It required the FCC to determine 
whether access to proprietary network elements was “necessary” and 
whether the failure to provide access to such elements would “impair” 
the requesting carrier’s ability to provide service.275 The statute also re-
quired incumbents to provide unbundled access at any technically feasi-
ble point.276 
The hope was that new entrants would use unbundling to combine 
their own facilities with facilities leased from the incumbents (those ele-
ments that still were natural monopolies) to provide service. In the words 
of Nicholas Economides, “[t]he basic logic behind the Telecommunica-
tions Act was to break the network into components and let everyone 
compete in every part.”277 In so doing, policymakers followed the same 
approach that they adopted when competition became possible with re-
spect to telephone handsets (known as customer premises equipment or 
CPE), long distance services, and new information services that com-
bined transmission with data processing: isolate those portions that con-
tinued to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics and mandate open ac-
cess to those portions.278 
Unbundling is now widely regarded as a failure.279 As of today, 
meaningful facilities-based competition for wireline telephone services 
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has yet to emerge.280 Although other reasons may exist for this outcome, 
modularity theory provides an answer that has not been appreciated. 
Consider the statutory requirement that incumbents provide un-
bundled access at any technically feasible point.281 This requirement pre-
sumes that it is possible to create a modular element at any location in 
the network. Modularity theory suggests why this approach was prob-
lematic. Modular interfaces cannot be established anywhere; they can be 
created only at thin crossing points where the number of interdependen-
cies is relatively low. 
Modularity theory also provides insights into problems with adopt-
ing an exclusively economically oriented approach for determining which 
elements would be modularized. After three failed attempts,282 the FCC 
was finally able to implement unbundling in a manner that withstood ju-
dicial review.283 Following the D.C. Circuit’s instructions that the rules be 
“linked (in some degree) to natural monopoly,”284 the agency’s rules 
adopted a decidedly economic approach. A proprietary network element 
was “necessary” only if lack of access would preclude the requesting car-
rier from providing service.285 With respect to nonproprietary network 
elements, requesting carriers would be “impaired” if lack of access repre-
sented a barrier to entry likely to make it uneconomic for a reasonably 
efficient competitor to enter.286 In both cases, regulators had to take into 
account whether the requesting carrier could build the requested net-
work elements itself or contract for the same services with another pro-
vider.287 The prices for unbundled access would be based on forward-
looking economic cost.288 
The FCC’s approach focuses on a network element’s cost character-
istics without taking into account the interdependencies between that el-
ement and the other portions of the network. If the element is tightly in-
tegrated with other components, any attempt to mandate access would 
be expected to fail regardless of whether it is a natural monopoly or is 
unavailable through other means. 
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Such interdependencies are more likely to arise under unbundling 
than under other forms of access because, as the Supreme Court noted in 
Trinko, unbundling involves network elements “deep within the bowels” 
of a local telephone network that can be made available only if “[n]ew 
systems [are] designed and implemented simply to make that access pos-
sible.”289 
Thus, unlike mandated access to CPE and long distance, which in-
volved a market boundary that was “simple, easy to monitor and re-
quire[d] little information,” the higher level of interdependencies associ-
ated with unbundling made it less likely that it would prove successful.290 
In short, unbundling attempted to introduce transactions into what is 
technologically a transaction-free zone.291 
Modularity theory also sheds new light on some of the disputes that 
arose during the debates over unbundling. For example, the local tele-
phone companies asked the FCC to interpret the unbundling require-
ment imposed by the third Computer Inquiry so as not to mandate “fun-
damental unbundling” on an element-by-element basis and instead only 
mandate access to larger combinations known as basic service elements292 
only to see that effort overturned on judicial review.293 To the extent that 
those larger combinations reflected interdependencies, modularity theo-
ry suggests that requiring that bundles of network elements be leased as 
a unit would have been well advised. 
Similarly, when implementing the 1996 Act, the FCC issued a rule 
that was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court preventing local tele-
phone companies from separating network elements that had already 
been combined together before leasing them to competitors.294 Again, 
modularity theory underscores that certain elements form integrated 
units that should be provided together. 
B. The Internet Protocol 
For the past several years, debates over Internet policy have been 
dominated by two big issues: network neutrality and the transition from 
IPv4 to IPv6. The Internet is designed around modular architecture em-
bodied in the layered suite of protocols known as the Transmission Con-
trol Protocol/Internet Protocol (“TCP/IP”).295 In many ways, the Internet 
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represents a classic example of how to use modularity to simplify a com-
plex system. Its central focus was to allow a heterogeneous group of 
hosts to interconnect through an equally heterogeneous set of transmis-
sion technologies.296 For example, each of the first four ARPANET sites 
(UCLA, UC Santa Barbara, SRI, and the University of Utah) each used 
a different type of computer as its host (CDS Ʃ-7, IBM 360/75, XDS 940, 
DEC PDP 10), which operated fundamentally incompatible design prin-
ciples.297 In addition, the original experiment that validated the Internet 
as a principle successfully integrated a wireline telephone network, a sat-
ellite-based network, and a mobile wireless network to send a single 
transmission.298 
The lynchpin of the TCP/IP suite is the network-layer protocol 
known as the Internet Protocol (“IP”).299 IP is a module that mediates 
both the diversity of applications and computers being run by end users 
(known as hosts) on the one hand and the diversity of transmission tech-
nologies on the other. Because of this, the Internet’s architecture is often 
portrayed as an hourglass, with a wide variety of host-based protocols at 
the top of the hourglass and a wide variety of networking and transmis-
sion technologies at the bottom.300 IP is “[t]he hourglass’ narrow waist,” 
which “represents a minimal and carefully chosen set of global capabili-
ties that allows both higher-level applications and lower-level communi-
cation technologies to coexist, share capabilities, and evolve rapidly.”301 
In other words, IP represents a modular interface that reflects careful de-
cisions about which interdependencies are allowed to be reflected in in-
teractions between hosts and networks. It is the limits on the visible in-
formation built into this interface that allows applications to ignore the 
details of the underlying transmission technology and vice versa. 
TCP/IP yields all of the advantages associated with modularity. It 
reduces the complexity of the system by rendering subsystems as inde-
pendent as possible from one another. It promotes flexibility and allows 
for simultaneous parallel experiments by a diversity of organizations. It 
enables third-party development of new applications without permission 
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from any other actors. However, even the architects of the TCP/IP pro-
tocol recognized that it is “a mixed blessing.”302 In fact, it is subject to a 
number of the drawbacks associated with all modular architectures. 
1. Restrictions on Functionality in IPv4 
Like all modular architectures, TCP/IP employs information hiding 
to limit and structure the interactions between modules. In so doing, it 
essentially embodies a precommitment about which types of information 
are important enough to pass between the modules. As a result, the lim-
ited nature of the interfaces inevitably “leads to a lack of understanding 
as to what one layer wishes to obtain from another.”303 
The details of why this is so are best understood by examining the 
information contained in the IP header, which constitutes the critical in-
terface in this particular modularization. The IP version 4 header consists 
of a fixed part consisting of five 32-bit words and an optional part that 
can consist of up to ten additional 32-bit words. 
FIGURE 4: THE IPV4 HEADER 
◄────────────────────32 bits────────────────────► 
Version IHL Type of  
Service 
 Total Length 
Identification DF/MF Fragment Offset 
Time to Live Protocol Header Checksum 
Source Address 
Destination Address 
Options (if any) 
Source:  Info. Sci. Inst., Internet Protocol:  DARPA Internet Program Protocol Speci-
fication 11 (Request for Comments 791, 1981), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/ 
rfc791. 
In the first word, Version specifies whether the packet is an IPv4 
packet or some other version. Because the length of the header varies, 
IHL stands for Internet Header Length and indicates when the header 
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ends and the data begins, which is necessary because the inclusion of op-
tions at the end of the header can cause the size of the header to vary. 
Type of Service allows senders to assign different levels of propriety to 
particularly packets. Total Length indicates the size of the entire packet, 
including both the data and the header. The second word consists of 
fields—Identification, DF (for Don’t Fragment), MF (for More Frag-
ments), and Fragmentation Offset—that are designed to allow IP to di-
vide a large packet into smaller fragments. The third word consists of 
three fields. Time to Live is a counter that is decremented each hop the 
packet traverses until the counter reaches zero in order to ensure that 
packets without a proper destination address do not wander around the 
Internet forever. Protocol specifies whether the packet is associated with 
TCP, UDP, or some other transport protocol. Header Checksum verifies 
the accuracy of the header. The fourth and fifth words consist of the 
Source Address and the Destination Address. The Options fields are rare-
ly used except for debugging purposes.304 
The visible information contained in the IP header inevitably con-
strains the type of information that can pass between the hosts connected 
to the edge of the network and the network itself. Because the infor-
mation in the IP header is basically limited to the type of service, 
transport protocol, source address, and destination address, it cannot 
support functionality that depends on any other information. This has 
particular import with respect to three functions: congestion manage-
ment, reliability, and security. 
a. Congestion Management 
Congestion management represents one of the central issues in the 
network neutrality debate. Indeed, the FCC listed congestion manage-
ment as an example of “reasonable network management” exempted 
from the nondiscrimination requirements established by its Open Inter-
net Order.305 The problem is that the IP header does not include a field 
through which hosts and the network can exchange information about 
congestion. In other words, congestion is one of the interdependencies 
that is part of the hidden information of the architecture and thus is 
opaque to all of the modules. 
Congestion occurs when multiple hosts attempt to use the network 
at the same time. Individual hosts, however, generally only possess in-
formation about their activities and typically lack information about the 
behavior of other hosts. The nodes in the core of the network are in a far 
better position to see the flows being generated by multiple users.306 The 
fact that congestion management requires information that is available 
                                                                                                                                         
 304. TANENBAUM, supra note 299, at 433–36. 
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only in the core similarly favors a core-based solution. At the same time, 
when congestion arises, the proper response is for hosts to cut their send-
ing rates in half.307 
Ideally, the IP header would contain a bit that networks could use 
to signal to hosts that the network is congested. Indeed, Raj Jain pro-
posed just such a solution during the Internet’s early days.308 A network-
based solution would have required upgrading the network’s core rout-
ers, which would have taken a long time and would have been prohibi-
tively expensive.309 Instead, Van Jacobson and Mike Karels devised a so-
lution based on the host-based approach to reliability embedded in 
TCP/IP.310 Under this approach, receiving hosts are supposed to 
acknowledge every packet they receive.311 If the sending host does not re-
ceive an acknowledgement within the expected amount of time, it 
resends the packet.312 
Jacobson and Karels realized that networks typically drop packets 
for only two reasons: either the packet became corrupted or the packet 
encountered a congested buffer that was full.313 Because wireline net-
works rarely corrupt packets, hosts could take the failure to receive an 
acknowledgement as a de facto signal that the network was congested 
and as an indication that they needed to reduce traffic.314 Unlike a net-
work-based solution, Jacobson and Karels’ solution only required chang-
ing a few lines of code in every host.315 
Jacobson and Karels never intended for their solution to be a per-
manent one.316 As an initial matter, because it depended on an inference 
from the lack of an acknowledgement, it worked only for traffic based on 
transport protocols that use acknowledgments, such as TCP.317 Modern 
applications such as streaming video and VoIP have placed increasing 
emphasis on protocols that do not use acknowledgements, such as 
UDP.318 
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Just as problematic is the growing importance of wireless broad-
band technologies. Unlike wireline networks, wireless networks often 
drop packets for reasons other than congestion, such as when atmospher-
ic conditions or reflections create a dead spot that limits the amount of 
bandwidth available or when a bad handoff between cell sites causes a 
transmission to become dropped.319 Thus, the advent of wireless broad-
band further undercuts the inference-based solution used to work around 
the absence of a field in the IP header through which networks can notify 
hosts directly about the presence of congestion. A later modification 
known as Explicit Congestion Notification (“ECN”) has made some in-
formation about congestion visible in the IP header,320 and a current initi-
ative known as Congestion Exposure (“ConEx”) is underway to insert 
additional information into the IP header.321 Neither is as yet mandatory 
in Internet implementations, and neither is widely deployed. 
b. Reliability 
Changes in the ways end users are using the Internet, both in terms 
of technologies and in terms of applications, can cause the optimal con-
figuration of the layered stack to change. Currently, responsibility for 
guaranteeing reliability rests with the hosts. While this approach made 
sense when networks were based around wireline telephone technolo-
gies, it makes less sense when wireless technologies are involved. Unlike 
wireline networks, which rarely drop packets for reasons other than con-
gestion, wireless networks suffer from much higher loss rates caused by 
the sensitivity of spectrum-based transmission to local conditions.322 
For this reason, early wireless networks like the San Francisco Bay 
Packet Radio Network (“PRNET”) employed a network-based reliabil-
ity system known as forward-error correction.323 This difference between 
wireline and wireless technologies also explains why modern wireless 
broadband networks are increasingly deploying network-based reliability 
systems, such as Automatic Repeat reQuest (“ARQ”), that detect 
transmission errors and retransmit the missing data without waiting for 
the host-based retransmission timer to expire and without consuming the 
additional network resources needed to retrieve the packet all the way 
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from the host.324 Other techniques that allow routers in the core to partic-
ipate in the transport layer exist as well.325 
These experiments with shifting responsibility for reliability from 
the hosts operating at the edge of the network into the network itself are 
part of the burgeoning literature on cross-layer design in wireless net-
works.326 This shift represents a clear deviation from the allocation of 
functions embodied in the TCP/IP reference model. That said, the prag-
matic approach of network engineering counsels against basing objec-
tions to incorporating cross-layer design into the network on rigid adher-
ence to a fundamentalist principle.327 Instead, it envisions that the 
allocation of functions will likely change over time with shifts in technol-
ogy and the underlying demand for network services. 
c. Security 
Another good example of the limits of the information contained in 
the IP header is network security. The current architecture does not 
permit verifiable information about the identity of particular end users to 
pass through the protocol stack.328 Despite the growing need for security, 
the network has been slow to adapt to this new reality. The shifting im-
portance of these concerns underscores the importance of not regarding 
any particular layered architecture as if it were a natural construct. 
Moreover, it underscores the potential dangers of using regulation to en-
shrine any particular architecture into law. 
2. Increase in Variety 
Another force providing impetus toward remodularization is the 
fundamental change in the external environment. The number of end us-
ers connecting to the Internet has exploded and become more heteroge-
neous in terms of geography, interests, and capabilities.329 They are using 
a wider variety of applications, many of which place new and more inten-
sive demands on the network.330 End users are connecting through an ev-
er broadening array of devices connected to an increasingly heterogene-
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ous set of transmission technologies.331 The business environment has be-
come more complex as well, both in terms of pricing and topology.332 
The Law of Requisite Variety dictates that the increase in the diver-
sity of the external environment will require the architecture to evolve in 
response, either by increasing the number of modules or by redesigning 
the interfaces to reduce the number of intermodule interactions. Either 
would require a remodularization of the Internet stack. 
3. Lack of Coordination 
Network engineers have also long recognized that the decentralized 
nature of congestion management can lead to persistent problems.333 Be-
cause individual end users can maximize their private benefits by contin-
uing to send traffic into the network while everyone else slows down, 
they have substantial private incentives to deviate from the social opti-
mum.334 The IP header does not provide any way for other actors to veri-
fy whether or not a host is responding appropriately to the presence of 
congestion. As noted earlier, the absence of a network-based means for 
ensuring that hosts reduce their transmission rates when the network is 
congested means that congestion management currently depends on 
what amounts to the honor system despite the fact that each end user has 
the incentive to deviate from the optimal behavior.335 Although the In-
ternet community may once have represented the type of close-knit 
community that could prevent such deviations from occurring, the rapid 
expansion of the Internet has undercut its ability to rely on social norms 
to protect against this type of behavior.336 
The decisions surrounding what information to place in the IP 
header thus limits the network’s ability to address certain types of prob-
lems. As in any modular architecture, the particular decisions about 
which interdependencies to acknowledge has a direct impact on the sys-
tem’s functionality. Imposing rules that forbid any deviations from the 
current architecture would risk foreclosing solutions to problems that 
continue to grow in importance. 
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4. Network Neutrality 
The decade-long debate over network neutrality appears to be ap-
proaching a major turning point. At its core, network neutrality propo-
nents oppose discrimination (providing some traffic more favorable 
treatment than others) and paid prioritization. 
Providing a comprehensive survey of the network neutrality debate 
exceeds the scope of this Article. For our purposes, it suffices to note 
that the ability to assign a higher priority to some packets has been a 
functionality contained in the visible information in the IPv4 since its in-
ception. Prioritization would amount to nothing more than taking ad-
vantage of the functionality built into the architecture. In the words of 
David Clark, “[t]he Internet is not neutral and has not been neutral for a 
long time.”337 
Equally importantly, many features of IP-enabled networks depend 
on some degree of prioritization. Proprietary voice over Internet Proto-
col (“VoIP”) services, such as Comcast Digital Voice, depend on some 
form of prioritization to ensure call quality, as does voice over LTE 
(“VoLTE”). Some video services, such as AT&T’s U-verse network, en-
sure quality by prioritizing traffic associated with a single application 
(video) from a single provider (AT&T).338 Finally, zero-rating systems 
such as T-Mobile’s Music Freedom and Binge On allow users to stream 
music without having that usage count against their data caps.339 Pro-
grams such as Facebook Zero, Twitter Zero, and Wikipedia Zero are us-
ing similar programs to help deploy Internet access in the developing 
world.340 They do so by making one application cheaper than others in a 
manner completely consistent with the existing architecture. 
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 339. T-MOBILE, http://www.t-mobile.com/offer/free-music-streaming.html (last visited Sept. 22, 
2015). 
 340. See generally Diana Carew, Policy Memo, Zero-Rating: Kick-Starting Internet Ecosystems in 
Developing Countries, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE (2005), available at http://www.progressive 
policy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2015.03-Carew_Zero-Rating_Kick-Starting-Internet-Eco 
systems-in-Developing-Countries.pdf.  
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5. The Transition to IPv6 
Perhaps the biggest change to the modular architecture of the In-
ternet is the transition to IPv6. IPv4 addresses consist of 32 bits, which 
supports 232 or roughly 4.3 billion addresses. Although the original Inter-
net architects thought that was more than enough to satisfy the expected 
demand,341 they did not anticipate that every consumer would have mul-
tiple devices connected to the network, let alone be seeking connectivity 
for numerous appliances in their home. As a result, the Internet began 
running out of new addresses in 2011.342 Consequently, the engineering 
community developed IPv6, which contains 2128 addresses343 or enough to 
assign 47 trillion trillion addresses to every person on the planet.344 
In addition to increasing the size of the address space, deployment 
of a new network protocol provided an occasion to consider whether to 
modify other aspects of the network architecture. For example, goals in-
cluded providing for better support for security, transmission of real-time 
data, and mobility.345 The resulting IPv6 header is depicted in Figure 5. 
Version specifies whether the packet is an IPv4 or IPv6 packet. Traf-
fic Class permits sending nodes and routers to assign different levels of 
priority to particular traffic similar to the Type of Service field in the 
IPv4 header. Flow Label provides a basis for associating different pack-
ets together for quality of service or real-time service. Payload Length 
describes the length of the packet following the header (including op-
tions). Next Header specifies whether the information immediately fol-
lowing the IPv6 header is one of the IPv6 extension headers that re-
placed the options in IPv4 or the transport protocol header that is the 
beginning of the payload. Hop Limit is a counter that is decremented by 
each time packet traverses a node until the counter reaches zero similar 
to the Time to Live field in the IPv4 header. Source Address and Destina-
tion Address specify the origin and termination point of the traffic. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 341. Laurie J. Flynn, Drumming Up More Addresses on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, 
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2014), http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html. 
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 344. See Internet Protocol Version 6: IPv6 for Consumers, Fed. Comm. Comm’n (July 16, 2014), 
https://www.fcc.gov/guides/internet-protocol-version-6-ipv6-consumers (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).  
 345. TANENBAUM, supra note 299, at 465. 
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FIGURE 5: THE IPV6 HEADER 
◄────────────────────32 bits────────────────────► 
Version Traffic Class Flow Label 





Source:  Stephen E. Deering & Robert M. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Version 6 
(IPv6) Specification 4 (Network Working Group Request for Comments 2460, 1998), 
available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2460. 
 
As noted earlier, the information visible in the interface reflects the 
architecture’s precommitment regarding the interdependencies that oth-
er modules are allowed and not allowed to take into account. Conse-
quently, the visible information retained, removed, or added to the 
header as part of this remodularization is quite telling. 
The retention of some fields is unsurprising. For example, the reten-
tion of fields specifying the source address, destination address, specify-
ing the size of the packet, and time to live are unremarkable. The dele-
tion of fields involving fragmentation and options reflect the shift of 
certain information outside of the primary header in order to speed up 
routing by including fewer fields, standardizing the header length and 
shifting responsibility for fragmentation and packet integrity to the hosts 
operating at the edge of the network.346 
Other decisions with respect to IPv6 header have more significant 
implications for the functionality of the network. Two examples of these 
decisions are the inclusion of fields to facilitate prioritization and the 
omission of fields to support security and mobility. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 346. Id. at 466–71. 
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a. Prioritization 
One of the most striking aspects of the IPv6 header is the inclusion 
of fields to facilitate prioritization of traffic. As noted above, the IPv4 
header has always included a Type of Service field to support providing 
different levels of quality of service.347 Although the original specification 
defined the field to focus solely on three types of quality of service: de-
lay, reliability, and throughput,348 it was subsequently redefined to permit 
more flexible use of this field through a protocol known as DiffServ.349 
The IPv6 Traffic Class field was explicitly designed to ensure that the ex-
periments in differentiated services built on the IPv4 Type of Service 
field would continue.350 The retention of this field reflects a continued 
commitment to support this functionality. 
What is even more striking is the addition of a new field to support 
even more sophisticated forms of quality of service. As noted earlier, the 
original architecture envisioned that the Internet would route each pack-
et through the network independently.351 The result is that packets asso-
ciated with the same flow could follow different paths, which could cause 
them to arrive with inconsistent spacing or even out of order. 
To solve this problem, the engineering community developed Mul-
tiProtocol Label Switching (“MPLS”), which assigns labels to packets as-
sociated with the same flow.352 This permits all packets bearing the same 
label to be routed along the same path.353 In addition, labels permit the 
implementation of a broad range of network policies, such as route selec-
tion, prioritization, load balancing, and other forms of traffic engineering 
that can provide for better security and quality of service.354 The MPLS 
header in which the label was embedded typically operates just below the 
network layer.355 
IPv6 borrows this aspect from MPLS by including a field for a Flow 
Label in the header of the network layer. It did so explicitly to enable 
“special handling by the IPv6 routers, such as non-default quality of ser-
                                                                                                                                         
 347. Info. Sci. Inst., Internet Protocol: DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification 2 (Re-
quest for Comments 791, Sept. 1981), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791. 
 348. Id. at 12–13. 
 349. Steven Blake et al., An Architecture for Differentiated Services 10 (Network Working Group 
Request for Comments 2475, Dec. 1998), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2475. 
 350. Steven E. Deering & Robert M. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 25 
(Network Working Group Request for Comments 2460, 1998) [hereinafter RFC 2460], available at 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2460. 
 351. See generally Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, http:// 
www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2015). 
 352. Eric C. Rosen et al., Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture 35 (Network Working 
Group Request for Comments 3031, Jan. 2001), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3031. 
 353. Id. at 4. 
 354. William Stallings, MPLS, INTERNET PROTOCOL J., Sept. 2001, at 2, 2–3. 
 355. The MPLS header can either encapsulate an IP packet, in which case it operates much like a 
data-link layer packet, or it can encapsulate transport layer packets, in which case it operates like the 
network layer. This is why it is sometimes said to operate at layer 2.5. 
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vice or ‘real-time’ service.”356 The inclusion of labels in the IPv6 specifica-
tion represents a renewed commitment to supporting prioritization of 
traffic. Even more importantly, the inclusion of the Flow Label in the 
spanning layer visible to all other network actors means that such traffic 
management represents part of the core functionality of the architectural 
design. 
b. Security 
Another area of controversy with respect to the design of IPv6 was 
security. Traditionally, security in IPv4 was implemented by the hosts 
operating at the edges of the network rather than by the network itself.357 
The IETF developed a security protocol for IPv6 that was retrofitted into 
IPv4 under the name IP Security (“IPsec”). IPsec is a fairly complex suite 
of protocols.358 Reduced to its basics, IPsec adds an extension header to 
the IP header with an authentication code to allow others to verify the 
packet’s integrity and encrypts the original IP packet (along with padding 
needed to make the relevant encryption work) to ensure confidentiality. 
When it operates in transport mode, it only encrypts the payload, where-
as when it operates in tunnel mode, it places the encrypted packet in an-
other IP packet.359 It then uses a designated number in the Protocol field 
in IPv4 or the Next Header field in IPv6 to let the receiving host or router 
know that the communication is being made using IPsec.360 Thus, IPsec 
requires all receiving routers and hosts to recognize this designation. In 
other words, it requires that this designation be part of the visible infor-
mation that all computers connected to the network are prepared to  
recognize. 
The development of IPv6 involved a wide discussion of how much 
security-related information to place in the visible information.361 In the 
end, the change was fairly modest, consisting only of adding to the IP 
header the information necessary to authenticate the communication and 
to decrypt the payload. The actual authentication was left to the hosts. 
Interestingly even though the initial specifications of IPv6 made this se-
curity regime mandatory,362 the specification was revised in 2011 to make 
it optional.363 The removal of this information from the mandatory as-
pects of the interface represents a major change in architectural com-
mitments. The fact that IPv6 opted not to include this much information 
                                                                                                                                         
 356. RFC 2460, supra note 350, at 25. 
 357. TANENBAUM, supra note 299, at 473. 
 358. For an accessible discussion, see KUROSE & ROSS, supra note 318, at 734–40. 
 359. Id. at 737–38. 
 360. Id. at 737. 
 361. Stephen Kent & Karen Seo, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol 57–58 (Network 
Working Group Request for Comments 4301, Dec. 2005), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4301. 
 362. RFC 2460, supra note 350, at 7; Stephen Kent & Karen Seo, Security Architecture for the In-
ternet Protocol (Network Working Group Request for Comments 4301, 2005), available at http:// 
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc4301. 
 363. Ed Jankiewicz et al., IPv6 Node Requirements 18 (Request for Comments 6434, Dec. 2011), 
available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6434. 
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represents a precommitment that the actual authentication be performed 
within one of the modules by limiting the amount of information that 
could pass through the interface. 
c. Mobility 
Another controversy surrounding IPv6 was the extent to which it 
would support mobility. As noted earlier, the IPv4 header includes a des-
tination address, which identifies a physical location. The fact that mobile 
hosts change locations means that relying on the traditional architecture 
would require constant updates to the routing architecture to reflect each 
mobile host’s current location. The problem is that updates to routing in-
formation take time to propagate through the network. That means that 
the network would struggle to maintain accurate information of the loca-
tion of each mobile host.364 
Instead, the mobility solution for IPv4 requires mobile hosts to des-
ignate a router on its home network as its home agent and asks that any-
one seeking to reach it send to that address.365 The home agent must also 
let other networks know that it is serving as the home agent for this par-
ticular mobile host.366 The mobile host then registers with a foreign agent 
on the network on which it is currently located either by contacting the 
foreign agent or by responding to an advertisement sent by the foreign 
agent.367 The foreign agent then sends a care-of address to the home 
agent to inform it where the packets addressed to the mobile host should 
be sent and to update that information if the mobile agent should trans-
fer to a different node.368 The home agent then encapsulates any traffic 
that it receives and forwards it to the foreign agent for delivery.369 The 
mobile agent then decapsulates the traffic.370 
This solution obviates the need for updating the routing tables, but 
it does incur some increased costs. The solution is quite complex, requir-
ing no fewer than seven protocols and a large number of signaling mes-
sages between the hosts and the routers to set it up. In addition, it can 
lead to what is often called “triangle routing,” because instead of passing 
directly to its destination, the packets must travel via the home agent. In 
extreme cases, the packets associated with a file being transferred be-
tween two people sitting next to each other in a conference room on the 
West Coast might have to travel to the East Coast and back. As such, it 
represents an apt illustration of David Wheeler’s aphorism: “[a]ll prob-
                                                                                                                                         
 364. Yoo, supra note 319, at 81. 
 365. Id.  
 366. Id.  
 367. Id.  
 368. Id.  
 369. Id.  
 370. Charles E. Perkins, IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised 10 (Internet Engineering Task 
Force Request for Comments 5944, Nov. 2010), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5944. 
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lems in computer science can be solved by another level of indirec-
tion . . . except for the problem of too many layers of indirection.”371 
Some engineers suggested pursuing a more straightforward solution 
to this problem during the transition to IPv6. Instead of relying on the 
hosts to send the packets indirectly by way of the home agent, the updat-
ed location information could be included in the network layer by having 
packets include the address of the mobile host’s current location. 
The solution was never adopted because of two concerns.372 The first 
was the difficulty in updating the mobile host’s location should the mo-
bile host shift to a new network.373 The second was the danger that an 
imposter could masquerade as the mobile host and highjack all of the 
communications bound for it.374 
Consequently, IPv6 declined to incorporate mobility support into 
the network layer and instead retained the indirect, host-based approach 
employed for IPv4. The IPv6 protocol did make some small refinements, 
such as eliminating the need for a foreign agent and routing return traffic 
directly instead of via the home agent (although this may be impossible if 
the foreign network’s gateway routers check the source address of IP 
packets and discard those that did not originate on its subnets).375 
The basic approach is not implemented through information in the 
primary interface visible to all other networks. Instead, mobility relies on 
the hosts to perform a number of complicated functions. Relying on 
hosts to handle mobility means that all of the hosts must be reconfigured 
in order to make any changes to the network. This can be quite cumber-
some and tends to retard innovative change. 
As a result, calls for embedding mobility support in the network 
layer have persisted.376 One major problem is that addresses serve two 
distinct purposes: labeling both the identity of the host and its location. 
The combination of these functions was unproblematic when hosts were 
immobile personal computers. The growing importance of mobility has 
led many engineers to call for an identity-locator split, in which distinct 
addresses are used to specify the identity of the host and its location.377 
New proposals along these lines continue to appear,378 although other en-
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 373. See id. 
 374. See id.; TANENBAUM, supra note 299, at 472. 
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gineers have questioned that approach.379 Still others place the responsi-
bility for exchanging signaling messages with the home agent on proxy 
agents instead of the mobile host.380 Empirical studies suggest that net-
work-based approaches may improve network performance.381 
For the purposes of this Article, whether the architecture ever em-
braces network-based mobility support is immaterial. The ongoing de-
bate underscores how shifts in the underlying technology and demand for 
wireless devices are changing the demands that people are placing on the 
network. It also provides an apt illustration of how influential decisions 
about what information to include in interfaces can affect the functionali-
ty of the network. 
C. Open Application Programming Interfaces (“APIs”) 
Modularity theory also sheds new light on calls for platform provid-
ers to open up their application programming interfaces (“APIs”). APIs 
are the interfaces that application providers use to give instructions to 
the underlying platform.382 APIs increase the modularity of the platform 
by providing a uniform set of commands that applications can use to 
communicate with the platform. For example, Microsoft maintains a 
number of APIs that application providers can use to produce software 
for the Windows operating system. Apple’s mobile operating system has 
a rich set of APIs that has unleashed a torrent of fascinating applications 
for the iPhone.383 So many people are producing applications for Face-
book that some observers have speculated Facebook’s APIs will displace 
the Internet suite protocols as the dominant communications platform.384 
There have been increasing calls to require platform owners to 
make their APIs open.385 Strategic denial of access to APIs to certain out-
side developers was the heart of the antitrust case against Microsoft.386 
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Calls for open access to smartphones such as the iPhone387 and social 
networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook388 have also emerged. 
Opening APIs would yield many potential benefits of faster innovation 
and greater flexibility. 
At the same time, mandating open interfaces would have a number 
of drawbacks. For example, Apple has traditionally insisted on closed 
APIs in order to guarantee that the end-users’ experience remained posi-
tive. Although it has loosened this policy somewhat with the iPhone, it 
still reviews all software before making it available through its App Store 
and insists on a share of the revenue that app developers generate 
through its product.389 Moreover, following the same approach as one’s 
competitors is generally bad business strategy; the mere fact that one’s 
competitor had adopted an open platform provides a substantial reason 
to adopt a closed one.390 The presence of a popular open platform, such 
as smartphones based on Google’s Android operating system, helps en-
sure that Apple’s iPhone business practices will not harm competition or 
innovation. 
The advent of smartphones has also unleashed a dramatic increase 
in the heterogeneity of applications running on mobile operating sys-
tems. To meet this demand, mobile operating system providers are ex-
perimenting with a wide range of new functionalities, many of which are 
implemented in widely different ways. For example, instead of providing 
video chat as a separate application, Apple’s FaceTime builds that fea-
ture into the underlying operating system.391 Google Wallet goes a step 
farther, taking a payment-system functionality traditionally provided as 
an application and building it into the chip.392 The growing heterogeneity 
of demand and dynamic nature of this platform make any attempt to 
mandate open access to any fixed set of APIs inherently problematic. 
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Even more interesting from the perspective of modularity theory is 
the lack of coordination. Modularity focuses actors on optimizing their 
individual interests, which may or may not in the aggregate optimize the 
performance of the system as a whole.393 Given that all companies are 
drawing off a common pool of surplus that they jointly create, they have 
the incentive to want others to do more.394 As was the case with GPTs,395 
this can lead to suboptimal investment in the entire modular ecosystem. 
The rise and fall of the IBM PC provides a useful example of the 
importance in the shift. Unlike Apple, who was the early market leader, 
IBM adopted an open modular architecture for its PC.396 Initially, this 
strategy proved spectacularly successful, as the open architecture re-
duced the magnitude of IBM’s upfront investment, allowed it to market 
its PC in only fifteen months, and unleashed a wide range of innovation 
within its platform.397 Fairly quickly, however, IBM’s strategy began to 
evince a number of downsides. The same modularity that unleashed par-
allel implementation permitted IBM’s former partners to capture an in-
creasing amount of the value and eventually to ally with other computer 
manufacturers that would ultimately displace IBM.398 The result was a 
lack of innovation in the platform. Similar complaints have been levied at 
Android.399 This contrasts starkly with Apple, which continues to both 
manufacture and innovate in computers and smartphones. 
Companies must think carefully about which parts of the value 
chain to continue to develop internally.400 Most notably, modularity al-
lows imitation as well as innovation.401 The lack of coordination can lead 
to significant economic harms. 
D. Future Internet Architecture Proposal 
Policymakers and commentators frequently assert that the Inter-
net’s architecture has played an instrumental role in its success and argue 
that that architecture must be preserved.402 Interestingly, this assertion is 
contradicted by a steady drumbeat of articles in the engineering litera-
ture noting the functions that the Internet does not perform well.403 These 
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include security, mobility, quality of service, mass media distribution 
(multicasting), and support for multiple connections to the same location 
(multihoming).404 Although these were not important when the Internet 
first emerged as a mass-market phenomenon during the mid-1990s, they 
have now become critical.405 
These analyses suggest that TCP/IP is a forty-year-old technology 
that was designed for a very different context and is being asked to do 
more than its designers ever imagined. Many engineering scholars com-
plain that the Internet has become ossified and impervious to significant 
architectural change.406 Others are pursuing a variety of “clean slate” ini-
tiatives examining how the Internet’s architecture might better meet 
these needs if it were designed from scratch today.407 Government agen-
cies in the U.S., Europe, and Asia have all launched programs to explore 
alternative architectures better suited to supporting the new demands 
that end users are placing on the network.408 For example, the National 
Science Foundation’s Future Internet Architecture program asked all 
participating projects to “mak[e] security an integral part of the architec-
ture” and “build security into the design.”409 For example, both the 
NEBULA and Named Data Networking projects required that each 
packet be cryptographically signed in the network layer, effectively mak-
ing each packet self-authenticating.410 
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Modularity theory emphasizes that all designs are the products of 
their times rather than the result of some preconceived vision of the ideal 
architecture.411 In addition, changes in needs and technological interde-
pendencies can lead to remodularization. Although they are rare, re-
modularizations do occur.412 For example, although Windows once repre-
sented a form of middleware running on a DOS operating system, it has 
now displaced DOS as the primary operating system platform. Similarly, 
although packet transmission began as an application riding on a voice 
network, packet transmission has now become the relevant platform, and 
voice has become an application riding on a data network rather than 
vice versa.413 
The costs of remodularization dictate that any such proposals 
should be approached with considerable caution. Modularity theory does 
offer some guidance as to the types of circumstances under which re-
modularization may be justified, including changes in the nature of tech-
nological interdependencies, increases in the degree of technological op-
portunity, and the growing heterogeneity of demand. Moreover, the 
inherent costs of remodularization raise the real possibility that an archi-
tecture may become locked into a modularization that is suboptimal. As 
the literature exploring how the presence of a large installed base can 
dampen innovation demonstrates, the real risk may be too little change 
rather than too much.414 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The benefits of modularity are frequently invoked as a justification 
for the imposition of regulations designed to preserve the status quo. 
There is no question that existing modular architecture can reduce com-
plexity, speed innovation, facilitate the division of labor, and promote 
flexibility. At the same time, modularity carries with it certain draw-
backs, a fact that is rarely acknowledged or understood. The balance of 
countervailing forces determines whether a particular modular architec-
ture is beneficial as well as how it should be implemented in terms of the 
number of modules, the division of tasks, and the construction of the 
necessary interfaces. Modularity theory underscores that this tradeoff 
cannot be determined a priori. Indeed, some scholars argue against a 
“presumption of ‘promodularity’ bias.”415 
Policymakers should therefore avoid treating the existing network 
architecture as if it were a natural construct that must be preserved at all 
                                                                                                                                         
 411. ABBATE, supra note 296, at 51 (“The ARPANET’s builders did not start out with a specific 
plan for how functions would be divided up among layers or how the interfaces and protocols would 
work. Rather, a layered model evolved as the ARPANET developed.”). 
 412. RFC 817, supra note 159, at 25. 
 413. Dave Clark et al., Overlay Networks and the Future of the Internet, 63 COMM. & STRATEGIES 
1, 1–2 (2006). 
 414. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, 
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941 (1986). 
 415. Ethiraj & Levinthal, supra note 10, at 172. 
YOO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2016 1:26 PM 
62 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
costs. Instead, modularity’s contingent quality underscores the im-
portance of developing heuristics for determining how and when a modu-
lar architecture should evolve. 
Even determining that modularity is the preferred policy is not suf-
ficient by itself to justify regulatory intervention. Network effects already 
provide strong incentives toward compatibility. Governmental action is 
necessary only if systems refuse to adopt modularity when it would be 
beneficial to do so. Moreover, the policy question should not be posited 
as a choice between modularity and nonmodularity. The optimal solution 
may be a hybrid, such as the one created by the coexistence of the open 
Google Android platform and the closed platform of the Apple iPhone. 
Purely as a matter of business strategy, the fact that one’s competitor had 
adopted a modular strategy makes it beneficial to pursue the opposite 
course. Moreover, consumers benefit from having more choices, and the 
presence of a major open platform protects against anticompetitive 
harms. 
On a broader level, the increasing frequency with which architec-
tural concepts such as modularity are invoked during policy debates 
makes understanding their conceptual underpinnings all the more im-
portant. Otherwise, the opacity of the engineering concepts will obscure 
debates rather than provide insights, while at the same time permitting 
advocates to introduce normative assumptions without appearing to do 
so.416 
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